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EDITORIAL 
 
PRIVILEGE ISSUES 
 
It gives us great pleasure to introduce you to our fourth edition of the Compliance El-
liance Journal (CEJ).  
 
We are particularly pleased of a significant innovation, which accompanies our new 
edition. From now on the CEJ has an Advisory Board, consisting of Derek Six (Compli-
ance Manager at DAW Group, Germany), Marcus Traut (Attorney at and Owner of 
Anwaltskanzlei Marcus Traut, Germany) and Kenneth Tung (Co-Founder and Chief 
Strategy Officer at In-Gear Legalytics Limited, China). We are glad that they are willing 
to support CEJ by their pushing ideas, suggestions and contributions. Thank you for 
deciding to join CEJ. 
 
Moreover, Cheryl E. Zuckerman, who is a Professor of Legal Writing and Lecturer in 
Law and Annette Torres, who is a Professor of Legal Writing, both at the University of 
Miami School of Law, will be part of our team. As mentors they will support ambitious 
students, who strive for submitting their contributions for CEJ. We would like to thank 
you for supporting us as well. 
 
You can read more about all of our new members under the section “Advisory Board”. 
 
This edition starts with the authors Bernd Mayer and Nicola Zeibig. In their essay “In-
house lawyer under the new German Legislation” they scrutinize the recent develop-
ment regarding the professional regulations of in-house lawyers. Thereby they focus on 
the legislative process as happened in Germany. The authors show up the significant 
differences of the in-house counsel's status before and after the legislative change within 
the Federal Lawyer's act. Moreover they point out potential difficulties for in-house 
lawyers, now that the law for them has changed. Dilemmas as to terms of Independence 
and of professional secrecy are just two of them. The content of this paper was first 
presented at International Legal Ethics Conference VII in New York in 2016. 
 
In our second piece, entitled “Company-internal Studies from the Public Prosecutor's 
Perspective – A critical Analysis of '10 Years after Siemens'”, Renate Wimmer deals with 
relevant questions all around internal investigations. Therefore she picks the famous 
“Siemens case” to function as thematic hook. She emphasizes the change in meaning 
from “foreign body” to “creature of habit”, which internal investigations have been 
undergone regarding the factual basis, whereas from the legal aspect internal investiga-
tions have not lost their status of being “foreign bodies”. Renate Wimmer examines 
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how the investigation authorities handle or should handle company-internal investiga-
tions and she discusses open legal questions as well. 
 
Thereafter follows the critical depiction of the protection zone of legal privilege in Ger-
man and US penal law in the article “The Enterprise in Testudo Formation” written by 
Hendrik Schneider. Based on the meaning of the legal privilege when it comes to Inter-
nal Investigations, the author outlines the existing differences of the legal situation in 
Germany on the one hand and the USA, where confidentiality is applied more gener-
ously, on the other hand. He thereby critically analyses why those differences cannot be 
proved sustainable and why the privileges should at least claim validity for the in-house 
lawyers in Germany as well. Moreover the essay contains solutions for Germany, in 
order to include in-house lawyers (so-called Syndikus) within the scope or the legal privi-
lege. The content of this paper was first presented at International Legal Ethics Confer-
ence VII in New York in 2016. 
 
Lastly, the student Luisa Andonie features the vulnerability of the United States taxpay-
ers' confidentiality due to the United States Whistleblower Program's lack of adequate 
protections in its push for compliance. 
 
 
With our best regards, 
 
 
 
Michele DeStefano & Dr. Hendrik Schneider 
Founders and Content Curators of CEJ 
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ADVISORY BOARD 
Derek Six 
BIOGRAPHY 
Derek Six, born and raised in northern Germany, attended high-school in Germany and 
California, US. Working as a paramedic during his “Zivildienst” and following universi-
ty studies he learned that most of the time the worst decision is to take no decision at all.  
 
Derek studied law at Christian-Albrecht-University in Kiel, Germany, passing first law 
examination in 1996 followed by his referendar time in Duisburg, Düsseldorf and San 
Francisco, California. He passed second law examination in 1999.  
 
After a short stop in a law firm specialized on trademark und commercial law in Düssel-
dorf he started out in the department Legal and Business Development of Deutsche 
Amphibolin-Werke von Robert Murjahn GmbH & Co KG, now DAW SE, in year 
2000.  
 
DAW SE is a family owned, private enterprise with appr. 5.600 employees and a turno-
ver of more than 1,2 billion Euro developing, producing and distributing paints, lac-
quers, mortars and a wide range of coating systems as well as thermal insulation systems. 
DAW SE has affiliated companies in most EU and many other countries. 
 
Over the last 16 years Derek was and still is responsible for various legal issues, e.g. IT 
contracts, national and international commercial contracts, trademark and IP law and 
administration, corporate law, M&A and many others.  
 
In 2003/2004 Derek successfully participated in a LL.M. oec program at University of 
Cologne, Germany, focusing on corporate, labour, patent, trademark, insolvency law as 
well as economic studies.  
 
Since 2011 he is responsible for the implementation and development of the Compliance 
Management Program of DAW Group, focused on corruption prevention and anti-
trust law. Derek is member of BCM, Germany, a union of Inhouse Compliance Manag-
ers. 
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DEREK SIX’ BIG FIVE IDEAS ON COMPLIANCE 
 
  Compliance Management is usually linked to the core business and aligned central 
departments of a company. If thoroughly implemented “compliance” needs to be 
acknowledged in every process of any entity. An almost impossible task if you don’t 
have unlimited resources and still want to make profit as a private company. In addition 
the various interests of Shareholders, Stakeholders, Management, individual personal 
interests of involved people and longtime implemented workflows (to name only a few) 
make it very complex and often political. On the other hand compliance is very easy 
with the right people in place and a management that has compliance and ethics includ-
ed in its strategy for the company´s business. 
Asked to give 5 ideas on Compliance I would like to name  
• Strategy 
• Common Sense 
• Added Value to business processes 
• Stringent Control and Sanctions 
• Communication (Compliance Managers shouldn´t take themselves 
too serious) 
knowing that you need a lot more to make compliance management a success. 
I. STRATEGY 
 
It´s a common saying that business follows strategy to be successful. And in fact this is 
true for compliance management as well. The top management of a company needs to 
have a strategy for their business that includes a strategy for a compliance and ethical 
approach. An approach that fits the philosophy of the company so it is believable by all 
stakeholders. Parameters for the strategy can be risk evaluations (although most risk 
assessments will lead to the same results in my opinion and show that corruption pre-
vention and anti-trust are key issues) and core values and strategic targets of the compa-
ny to name 2 major aspects. Compliance management needs a strong and stable support 
as it will most likely come to discussions with managers that might have different priori-
ties on business decisions. Knowing that, having a strategy on the compliance and ethi-
cal approach is fundamental and must be backed by the top management (and share-
holders). 
II. COMMON SENSE 
 
Business is done between people that in general have a common sense well built on their 
family background, education and many other individual aspects. Common Sense of 
most people let them know what´s wrong or wright – the others must be identified.  
 
That is why in my opinion compliance is common sense based on implemented and 
communicated rules. Rules may be defined as laws and internal and external directives, 
principles and guidelines.  
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Defined as that compliance is part of business and administration management since the 
beginning of doing business – in many cases not under the name “Compliance” but 
expressions with similar meaning. This needs to be emphasized because compliance is 
not a new thing, it was/should have been/is/should be a vital part of business admin-
istration in most companies in most parts of the world.  
 
An essential part of compliance management should therefore be to remind and 
strengthen the common sense of the stakeholders, especially employees and to encour-
age them to well consider it in the decisions they take in the course of business. 
 
Too simple? Maybe, but it´s like in any sport: the basics must be repeated and trained in 
order to get ahead and develop additional skills. Strengthen the common sense is such a 
basic element to ensure successful compliance management. 
III. ADDED VALUE TO BUSINESS PROCESSES 
 
Always find a way to add value to the business. 
 
Any compliance approach needs to take a close look at the business processes of an enti-
ty or business unit. This integrated compliance with clear and effective business process-
es will transport and strengthen compliant behavior.  
 
In addition a combination of process evaluation or definition serves several goals for the 
benefit of the company, e.g:  
 
• Process owner and stakeholders create any modifications to the process 
themselves: added compliance/controlling elements evolve from “the 
inside” of the business unit. That way acceptance is higher and it is 
more likely to act according “own” process and rules. 
• Review of processes with process owner and stakeholders should lead 
to more efficient processes. That way compliance approach adds value 
to the business processes. 
 
Compliance should be no issue next to but implemented in the business processes and 
decisions (of any kind and level). 
IV. STRINGENT CONTROL AND SANCTIONS 
 
Part of the process integrated approach are defined controlling mechanisms following 
the responsibilities and competences of involved departments (e.g. Internal Audit, Le-
gal, Controlling, Compliance). Detected misbehaviour or ignorance must be sanctioned 
– sanctions must be transparent, stringent, appropriate and communicated to the most 
possible extent.  
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I am no fan of a “zero tolerance” proclamation as it is almost impossible for company to 
truly stick to such a rule but I am convinced that if a violation of defined rules is not 
sanctioned as described above it will lead to less discipline in the respective process by 
the stakeholders in future.  
 
No control, no sanctions – no discipline, no effective processes: no added value.  
 
Or even more simple: No compliance – no effective business. 
 
V. COMMUNICATION - COMPLIANCE MANAGERS SHOULDN´T TAKE 
THEMSELVES TOO SERIOUS 
 
Last but not least you need an appropriate communication on compliance issues in the 
company. This might be the hardest part of all as communication should fit the compa-
ny culture, identify and reach relevant stakeholders but must not annoy. Less is some-
times more – a true saying on compliance communication I would say. You don´t find a 
culture in every company that deem comics, videos or gaming apps to be appropriate 
compliance communication tools. Every compliance department must find their own, 
appropriate way of communication for the benefit of the company. 
 
Being the communicator in their own business Compliance Managers shouldn´t take 
themselves too serious. Compliance should be integral part of business processes and as 
that it should be self-explaining that we should work on making things and business 
possible, we should not hinder it if not absolutely necessary. 
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ADVISORY BOARD 
Marcus Traut 
BIOGRAPHY 
Marcus Traut is an attorney and an accredited specialist in criminal law. His law firm is 
located in Wiesbaden, Hessen, Germany, with a district office in Würzburg, Bavaria, 
Germany. 
 
After finishing his legal studies at the Johannes-Gutenberg-University of Mainz, he 
completed his practical legal training within the district of the Regional Court Wiesba-
den. 
 
Since his admission as a lawyer, Traut has exclusively practiced in the field of criminal 
law and is a very experienced defense lawyer. In 1999, the Board of the Chamber of Law-
yers Frankfurt am Main granted him the right to use the title “Accredited Specialist for 
Criminal Law” based on his particular theoretic and practical qualifications. 
 
The law firm Marcus Traut exclusively specialises in the field of criminal law, especially 
in the areas of white-collar crime, criminal tax law, criminal corruption law, criminal 
medical law, and criminal appellate law. 
 
In addition to defending individuals in criminal proceedings and representing them in 
occupational law proceedings, the law firm also offers legal counseling and representa-
tion to business enterprises. 
 
The law firm Traut offers preventive counseling on criminal law (compliance) and in-
ternal investigations. 
 
Offering preventive counseling to companies on criminal law issues is becoming increas-
ingly important in the firm’s regular consulting practice. 
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MARCUS TRAUT’S FIVE SUPPORTING PILLARS OF COMPLIANCE 
 
  Compliance is crucial for all economic players worldwide. 
   
Thus, enterprises and authorities are requested to comply with the multitude of appli-
cable regulations. Further regulations enter into force. Again and again, attempts are 
made to define so-called Codes of Conduct or Codes of Ethics and to oblige parties to 
comply with them. At the same time, new penal provisions are passed for violations of 
compliance regulations. 
 
In this context it becomes apparent how difficult it is to define the term "compliance", 
simply because no general rules apply to private enterprises or authorities, and in partic-
ular to different countries on different continents. 
 
In the author's opinion, however, there are fundamental principles which should always 
apply worldwide, despite different jurisdictions and legal regulations. In spite of differ-
ent values, cultures and legal views it should be possible to define generally applicable 
common denominators. These cornerstones can - though subject to certain amend-
ments - always be transferred to other users. The following shall illustrate, which major 
five common denominators should apply internationally - wherever - i.e. be indispensa-
ble in compliance structures. These cornerstones are: 
• Attitude 
• Rules 
• Control 
• Consequences of violations 
• Improvement 
In detail: 
I. ATTITUDE 
 
  The fundamental basis is the awareness that compliance is necessary and the willingness 
to act accordingly. Functioning compliance systems can be implemented only with a 
positive attitude. Such attitude, however, also requires the willingness to discipline one-
self and others, but to generally recognise the necessity of compliance as a natural re-
quirement. 
 
Thus, a positive, demanding and supportive environment always needs to be created for 
all parties, where performance and compliance with fundamental values are recognised 
and rewarded, with equal chances and development options for each individual. 
 
After all, the concept of compliance is to reinforce the legal and ethical principles in the 
action and awareness, i.e. the attitude of employees and responsible persons. This, how-
ever, is possible only if all parties accept that their actions depend on practicability and 
admissibility. Crossing borders must be taboo. All of parties involved have to be con-
vinced of the attitude. It is of utmost importance that the management acts as a role 
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model for good conduct and attitude, setting the so-called "tone at the top". Only then 
can a compliance philosophy evolve. 
II. RULES 
 
The digital and very complex world of the 21st century requires rules to govern interac-
tion. It is necessary that legal regulations exist which determine and document behav-
iour. It goes without saying that everybody is bound by law and order. However, legal 
frameworks that guarantee open, transparent and fair cooperation have to be created for 
all parties in the development of compliance structures. 
   
These rules extend to national and international regulations such as those which govern 
the cooperation between parties and which sanction the non-compliance with agree-
ments, but they also include the drafting of a so-called Code of Conduct or Code of 
Ethics. 
 
Penal law always lays down regulations which in the event of violations provide for 
penalties for persons but also for fines to be paid by enterprises and corporate bodies. 
Therefore, organisational obligations according to penal law must also always be com-
plied with. 
III. CONTROL 
 
The creation of rules requires control of compliance with the same. Only if effective 
control mechanisms are installed for ensuring that the rules are complied with will it be 
possible to actually guarantee compliance. There are numerous options for self-control 
or for third-party control. 
 
Compliance with existing regulations must always be checked - however, changes and 
new or increasing risks must also always be pointed out. This requires regular reviews of 
business transactions and processes, for example by informal checks or random sam-
pling, but also by checks for potential weaknesses in a system.  
 
Formal controls on whether compliance systems work need to be additionally per-
formed.  
 
It is of course necessary that persons identifying the violations also disclose them. Creat-
ing the function of an ombudsman can be just as useful as motivating whistleblowers. 
 
Besides, it is necessary to document any compliance incidents, but also their controls. 
IV. CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLATION 
 
The implementation of compliance structures and their controls make sense only if 
violations have consequences.  
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It already applies that violations of compliance regulations have noticeable consequenc-
es.  
 
Thus, enterprises are regularly threatened with high fines in case of violations, and deci-
sion makers regularly face criminal proceedings. Additionally, claims for damages are 
frequently asserted against them.  
 
Violations of compliance structures regularly cause considerable costs. 
V. IMPROVEMENT 
 
Any crisis also includes a chance.  
 
It is not always detrimental when violations of existing rules are identified during con-
trols and entail consequences. This also gives rise to the opportunity to learn from a 
crisis and to improve. Naturally, it then needs to be regularly checked whether the exist-
ing compliance structures have to be adjusted. At least, it has to be analyzed why the 
violations occurred and how they can be prevented in the future.  
 
If such analysis is successful and leads to changes in the compliance structures, then a 
crisis can also fulfil the purpose of learning from it. 
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ADVISORY BOARD 
Kenneth Tung 
BIOGRAPHY 
Kenneth Tung, Founder and Chief Strategy Officer, In-Gear Legalytics Limited 
 
As a lawyer with almost three decades in commerce, Kenny has embarked on a journey 
that has seen him play many roles, including lawyer, business manger, ideas curator, 
evangelist, strategist and solution provider. Kenny is seen as someone who relates to a 
broad range of disciplines and naturally gravitates to a holistic approach to solving prob-
lems. 
 
He believes that the legal service industry will change at an accelerating rate and decided 
to dedicate the rest of his career playing a role in this transformation.  Upon graduation 
from Columbia University School of Law, Kenny practiced in New York City with 
Coopers & Lybrand International Tax Group and Goodman Phillips & Vineberg, be-
fore joining Coudert Brothers in China.   After having worked on landmark projects 
such as negotiating the Shanghai GM JVs, he moved in-house (in search of what hap-
pens before and after business engagements with external counsel) and served as the 
regional GC for Kodak, Honeywell, Goodyear and PepsiCo in various geographies and 
business units. 
 
After serving as the Chief Legal Counsel at Geely Holding, working primarily on new 
projects and strategies around the world, Kenny has been the ad hoc GC under Lex 
Sigma Ltd. advising top global industrial and financial players on strategic and business-
critical issues and projects in Asia. 
 
Together with Bill Novomisle, Kenny co-founded In-Gear Legalytics Limited to help 
bring efficacy and efficiency to existing and new providers of legal services. In a career 
inside multinational companies for almost two decades, Kenny has been building on his 
business and law experience and learned about driving process and efficiency in complex 
organizations. In-Gear has been advising clients such as a Magic Circle law firm and the 
top media player in India. 
 
Born in Hong Kong to parents who left mainland China in the 1940s, Kenny went to a 
Chinese school before leaving for the U.S. to attend Choate and then college and law 
school at Columbia University 
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KENNETH TUNG’S FIVE BIG IDEAS IN COMPLIANCE MANAGEMENT 
 
  In 1997, when the author took up his first regional general counsel role, among the 
inheritance from his predecessor was a general memo on the FCPA.  The author duly 
studied and learned from the memo, but compliance matters as we know it today did 
not take up a major part of his responsibilities.  In 2005 in New York, the author spoke 
at his first conference on compliance, not so much for any experience in investigations 
or negotiating with the DOJ & SEC, but more as a voice from the business.  Since then, 
the following five topics have been stirring in the author’s mind, some of these informed 
by new developments such as technology and behavioral science, but all top of mind 
ideas that may shed a light on why compliance can be a strategic corporate function. 
 
This is because compliance is much more than a check-the-box cost center with policy 
wonks who are designated as the conscience of their organizations or called upon to 
ceremonially pull the “stop” handle long after the problem became too big to fix.  An 
effective compliance program flies off the page to imbue decisions even in day-to-day 
activities and permeate the organization.  Compliance is part of everyone’s job, and 
therefore is about inducing everyone in an organization to triage and trade off, not just 
about simple do’s and don’ts and records on training sessions.  Compliance cannot be 
summed up by merely a declaration of “zero tolerance”, a list of company values or 
keeping a steady hand on reputational risks.  It has context and is an integral part of a 
sustainable strategy to achieve an organization’s goals, be it business models to achieve 
profits or policy implementation to deliver public good. 
I. FINDING A COMPLIANCE STRATEGY & DEFINING THE FUNCTION 
 
  Self-regulation existed arguably since the beginning of human time (the Golden Rule), 
an example being the guilds in Middle Ages and their equivalents in ancient civiliza-
tions.  However, the compliance role has been a relatively new profession in the business 
world as recruiters around the world would tell us. Born in an ambit much broader than 
public accounting function, compliance faces myriad and proliferating government 
regulations as well as labors to anticipate socio-economic forces, now ricocheting at the 
speed of social media. 
 
A conversation about principal approaches to compliance helps to illustrate the head-
aches of chief compliance officers.  Take the FCPA in the U.S., the journey so far does 
not paint a proud picture of compliance – fines, monitors, bigger fines, reputational 
risks (some impact on a listed company’s stock price and abilities to do business), closing 
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down the third parties and other willful ignorance excuses, whistleblowers protection 
and incentives (to tell on businesses), criminal sanctions for individuals1, rejection of 
paper-only/public relations like compliance programs,2 and recently credits for compa-
nies to point out individual liabilities (the Yates memo).  It reads like a Hollywood script 
for Godfather with the Fed’s strategy in pushing the gangsters to testify against each 
other under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act.  Has our 
compliance effort come to this? 
 
Behind closed doors, seasoned compliance leaders have been drawn into heated debates 
and form battle lines about whether a company’s compliance policy and practice should 
accomplish just enough to meet the common denominators of regulatory expectations 
from relevant jurisdictions or be driven by a “true north” standard above all applicable 
laws.  One point the people in the arena do agree on: many have experienced the frustra-
tion of the whack-a-mole school of compliance which is an untenable strategy. 
 
In this light, organizations, whether businesses, NGOs and international sport associa-
tions are going through the growing pains in determining how their compliance de-
partments fit into the organizational structure.  For example, whether the chief compli-
ance officers should report to an organization’s board or its CEO has been discussed as a 
“hot topic”.  While this determination raises the awareness to develop compliance func-
tion into more than a “window dressing” exercise (or a pretty vase, as in a Chinese say-
ing), this topic may turn out to be a red herring.  The trade-off between independence 
and effectiveness needs to be managed from the highest governing bodies down through 
the organizations, regardless of which reporting line may be adopted.   
 
A more useful focus may be to define the purpose of a compliance function and how it 
fits along the organization’s strategy and reason for existence.  More on this later. 
II. GLOBALIZATION 
 
As technologies that thrive upon the internet converge to bring us into the Information 
Age (following the Agricultural & Industrial Ages), the world has experienced the high-
est level of global trade, financial flows and information exchanges that history has wit-
nessed. Also going global are fraud opportunities, validating the universality of human 
natures that underpin the fraud triangle. 
 
Next, hot on the heels, it will not be a surprise to see law enforcement to go global.  The 
U.S. has led by decades in the international application of antitrust, anti-corruption and 
sanctions laws.  Back in a less international world, some of these applications were per-
ceived as downright bullying attempts to exercise long arm jurisdiction.  Today, we have 			
1  Compare in China application of criminal liabilities for corporate executives who know or have reason to 
know wrongdoings. 
2  See, e.g., Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs recently issued by the U.S. DOJ. 
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regular cooperation among national authorities exchanging information and even coor-
dinating prosecutions and extraditions, perhaps driven in part by the contributions of 
the fines to the fisc.  Together with international anti-money laundering networks, driv-
en in part by terrorist activities, these three “anti’s” form a triad of a global law enforce-
ment that is worthy of comparison with the Interpol. 
 
This brings multiple risks, and multiple-jeopardies, to companies that operate in multi-
ple jurisdictions.  It is not uncommon today to hear about coordination with other parts 
of a company or its HQ before deciding on responses to investigation, allegations or 
whistleblowing reports in a particular country, voluntarily disclosure in one jurisdiction 
versus another, the pressure of the game of being the first to disclose, etc., all snowball-
ing into a complex calculus. 
 
Western multinationals have been among the firsts to tackle the challenges and discon-
tinuities of cultural, practical and legal aspects of these compliance issues.  Now multina-
tionals from emerging markets are paying attention to adapt to the expectations and 
regimes in the west where they are becoming significant investors.  It is during these 
times and circumstances that compliance leaders must be conversant with and guided by 
their respective organizations’ globalization business strategy, if only to prioritize solu-
tions and decide on trade-offs. 
   
III. DATA ANALYTICS, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (AI) AND TECHNOLOGY 
 
Among the fanfare of compliance management systems and IT augmented risk man-
agement systems, witness JP Morgan’s 2015 announcement of a billion-dollar invest-
ment in a system, including algorithms that help to predict employees’ rogue activities 
before the employees themselves commit any wrongdoing.  Think of the Pre-Crime 
team in the movie, Minority Report. 
 
Under a more prosaic view, many companies have been deploying compliance systems 
to chew through structured and increasingly unstructured data generated by the organi-
zations.  The systems enable the companies to investigate and, to some extent, prevent 
wrongdoing, and to support the notion that their compliance systems have met stand-
ards of an effective compliance program in practice prescribed by the authorities. 
 
Before compliance teams go out to select one of these compliance management systems 
from the bewildering range of offerings, it would behoove us to distinguish among sys-
tem/platform, process and people.  Here lies the hard-learned lesson that a significant 
proportion of technology deployment fails.  More precisely, technology famously failed 
in adoption by many organizations.  One only needs to picture a cart before a horse as 
an organization suits up in technology, often with vendors who don't understand the 
beginnings of the company’s business strategy and operations, and little to no apprecia-
tion by the relevant function (here being legal and compliance) and the implementation 
agents of the job to be done by the entire organization. 
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So the starting point for compliance is to work with the rest of the organization to ap-
preciate the workings of the body of a patient that we call the business of the organiza-
tion - the strategies being deployed at any one time, the strategic initiatives, their imple-
mentation and day-to-day operations that follow.  From there compliance needs to sort 
through how various parts of the organization are set up to do their jobs, how compli-
ance mandates will impact such activities, solving conflicts, assessing trade-offs in vari-
ous solutions and persevering in the change management required to implement these 
compliance mandates. 
 
Only then will we have the blue print to talk to vendors and technology experts about a 
system that is informed by such insights to automate and augment a compliance pro-
gram.  This will of course require access to talents in the data analytics field that are in 
short supply, decisions on IT systems that suit the organization’s people and processes 
in a dynamic business road map, and contending with cultural stereotypes and bias that 
stick only with anecdotes, judgment and intuition and resist to consider data and com-
puting power. 
 
For those who are lucky enough to work in more data sophisticated organizations, they 
may even be able to design a compliance system that will convert colleagues’ perception 
of legal & compliance resources from being un-parsable and unhelpful to meeting today 
clients’ expectation in terms of providing instant access, seamless interoperability, mo-
bile connectivity, and an intuitively obvious user experience. 
 
In the broader business world and across industries, the above is not a recent discovery, 
but the compliance function’s recognition of what technology may involve as a big idea 
will be an important step in the right direction. 
IV. EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE (EI) 
 
This concept dovetails into the discussion above on AI augmented fraud detection 
technologies.  As the Tom Cruises in the Pre-Crime - ahem - compliance department 
profile likely offenders before the proto-offenders commit the offense, we should also 
delve deeper into the fraud triangle to understand how to deter non-compliant behav-
iors and align the rest of the organization, from social forces to whistleblowers psychol-
ogy, to address root causes and perceptions of compliance. 
 
In addition to data analytics, compliance functions and supporting professionals can 
and should leverage recent advances in behavioral sciences, whether from the field of 
economics or behavioral science.  For example, connecting parts of the organization to 
the perspective of an offender, before, during and after apprehension brings out the 
human angle of what compliance needs to address, beyond some box checking routine, 
abstract anecdotes and case studies. 
 
In many cultures, the compliance function has to turn around the tribal and deep seated 
feelings that compliance serves as the tool of the corporate hierarchy, out there to scape-
goat the under-informed and unfortunate who get caught in the bureaucratic net with 
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some minor and victimless infractions, and to make the boss’s look good in maintaining 
“zero tolerance”.  Everyone in the organization pulling for compliance makes the differ-
ence between being against the tide and with the tide. 
 
The application of behavioral science touches every corner of an organization.  This is 
because compliance is everyone’s job.  But at the same time, the compliance function 
needs to take leadership in this effort. 
V. CORPORATE LEGAL/COMPLIANCE STRATEGY 
 
The point above on defining the compliance strategy and function goes hand-in-hand 
with business strategies of an enterprise or, in case of a non-commercial organization, its 
mission and strategies. 
 
The idea here is not to emphasize that the tail should not wag the dog or that no busi-
ness has room for conscience.  It is to lead with the reason of existence of the organiza-
tion.  Whether in a world with a developed socio-economic environment that has been 
cultivating generations of citizens who share a political culture that values the rule of law 
or in the “wild west” where might still makes right, all organizations have a job to be 
done.  Compliance must advance and be an integral part of the reason for existence of 
the organization, not only just to help avoid fines and reputational damage. 
 
A similar argument has been made for corporate social responsibility – that it is not just 
charity, public relations or some feel-good aspects of social media marketing.  A CSR 
that gets traction is one that gets in-gear with one or more core strategies of a business. 
 
The same goes for compliance. 
 
Moreover, for a compliance effort to be successful, it must work through the business 
models, operations, people and processes lest it will just end up as a compliance program 
on paper only.  That means compliance must cross silos.  Being deeply connected to and 
driven by the organization’s strategy will give a fighting chance to initiate and reach 
understanding with the rest of the organization and to achieve the delicate balance un-
der a common purpose.  Speaking the same language as those in charge of the business 
of the organization will also help to avoid the all too common phenomenon of the “tone 
at the top” diluting into “muddle in the middle” and ending up in “baffle at the bot-
tom”. 
 
To this end the compliance function, like corporate legal departments, has first to assess 
and fill in the gaps its current capabilities. 
 
The punch list for gap closure is not long but fundamentally includes many “business” 
competence.  Compliance professionals, whether or not lawyers, must debunk the ex-
pectation and perception that we operate like lone wolves rather than as members of 
teams who must trust and delegate.  We need to stop leading only with the rules and 
regulations and adopt the mind frame of an owner who is driven to make the business 
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model work, and if necessary reinvent a business model that can circumvent external 
barriers, whether or not founded on laws and regulations.  That is to say, be someone 
who can navigate the spheres of rules, business needs and facts with equal fluency. 
 
******************************************* 
 
It is only on the basis of having realized these ideas can an organization gain the credibil-
ity to discuss “zero tolerance”. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
   They say that hard cases make bad law.2 The following paper focuses on a legislative 
process in Germany in which the lawmakers followed the path of least resistance and 
produced a new regulatory framework for the legal profession without due justification. 
Following two decisions by the Federal Social Court of Germany in 2014, in which the 
Court held that the occupational field of in-house counsels is profoundly different from 
that laid out in the German Federal Lawyers’ Act, a new statutory regulation for said 
professional group was passed and came into force by 1 January 2016. 
 
Admittance to the bar is mandatory for lawyers in Germany and according to the Feder-
al Bar Association’s annual statistics approximately 164.000 lawyers were admitted in 
Germany in 2015.3 With a population of around 82 million4 this translates to about 200 
lawyers per 100.000 citizens. In comparison, at a population of around 320 million5 
there are roughly 1.3 million attorneys6 in the United States which results in a ratio of 
400 lawyers per 100.000 citizens. The aforementioned new regulation in Germany ad-
dresses about 40.000 in-house lawyers.7 The term ‘in-house lawyer’ in the context of 
this paper refers to lawyers who are employed at a company or corporation which is not 
a law firm. This distinction is essential to understand the dimension of the legislative 
change. The new regulation stipulates that in-house counsels as well as lawyers fall with-
in the scope of said law. This alignment is bound to raise questions how an in-house 
lawyer can reasonably be expected to adhere to the same standards of professional con-
duct that an independent lawyer has to honor. Professional independence on the one 
side and being subject to directions by their superiors within the company, namely the 
board, might create a constant field of tension for in-house counsels. Focusing on the 
cornerstones of professional conduct certain issues become apparent. 
II. STATUS OF THE IN-HOUSE COUNSEL BEFORE THE LEGISLATIVE 
CHANGE WITHIN THE FEDERAL LAWYERS' ACT 
 
   Before the new regulations came into force, academic literature assumed that an in-			
2
  Hodgens v. Hodgens (1837), quoted in FRED SHAPIRO, THE YALE BOOK OF QUOTATIONS (2006). 
3
  German Federal Bar Association, Member statistics, Jan. 1, 2015, see: 
http://www.brak.de/w/files/04_fuer_journalisten/statistiken/2015/grmgstatisitik2015.pdf. 
4
  Federal Statistical Office, Press release of Aug. 26, 2016 – 295/16, see: 
https://www.destatis.de/DE/PresseService/Presse/Pressemitteilungen/2016/08/PD16_295_12411pdf.pdf?__
blob=publicationFile. 
5
  United States Census Bureau (Jan. 15, 2017, 7:11 PM), see: https://www.census.gov/topics/population.html. 
6
  American Bar Association, National Lawyer Population Survey (2015). 
7
  Legislative draft on the regulation of the legal profession of in-house lawyers 13 (BT printed matter 18/5201, 
June 30, 2015). 
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house counsel could fulfill two rather different functions: On the one hand, the in-
house counsel held an employment which was subject to directives by the employer; on 
the other hand, he could have a second occupation as a lawyer in the sense of the Federal 
Lawyers’ Act. 
 
The first was not considered to be typical attorney work and as such would not have to 
conform to the professional standards and duties set out in the Act. In his second occu-
pation as a lawyer he was barred from representing his employer in court or in front of 
arbitral tribunals, cf. § 46 Federal Lawyers’ Act (old version). This prohibition to repre-
sent the employer in court came into effect only in proceedings where the representation 
by a lawyer is mandatory. In any other proceedings, the in-house counsel could still be 
present as his employer’s representative.8 For the second occupation as a lawyer to be 
permissible, the Act required to conform with § 7 no. 8 Federal Lawyers’ Act. This pro-
vision states that the applicant’s envisioned occupation needs to be consistent with the 
profession of a lawyer in the sense of the Act. In particular, his status as an independent 
agent in the administration of justice and the general confidence in his professional in-
dependence must be upheld. This two-fold approach was based on a case-by-case as-
sessment and its general compliance with the statutory regulation in § 7 no. 8 Federal 
Lawyers’ Act was judicially accepted. 
III. LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND FOR THE NEW REGULATION AND ITS EF-
FECTS 
 
The legislators aimed to ensure the pension entitlements for in-house lawyers which 
were endangered after rulings by the Federal Social Court. As a background, lawyers 
admitted to the bar are exempted from the general pension systems to which all employ-
ees have to contribute according to a statutory scale. The entitlement to the lawyers’ 
pension fund is considerably higher compared to the state managed pension funds. This 
monetary incentive seems to have been the motivation for the respective interest groups 
to promote the legislative alignment of in-house lawyers and lawyers which ultimately 
led to a legislation which affects only a limited number of in-house lawyers and which 
results in significant conflicts regarding professional conduct. In a broader sense, it is a 
remarkable example for the underlying drivers in a law-making process. 
 
A. Decisions of the Federal Social Court in 2014 
 
With the legal amendment of the Federal Lawyers’ Act, the legislator responded to two 
rulings by the Federal Social Court of April 3, 2014 (B 5 RE 13/14 R9 and B 5 RE 9/14 			
8
  WILHELM FEUERICH & DAG WEYLAND, COMMENTARY ON THE FEDERAL LAWYERS’ ACT, § 46 para. 20 
(9th ed. 2016). 
9
  BSG: Versicherungspflicht in der gesetzlichen Rentenversicherung für Syndikusanwälte, NEUE JURISTISCHE 
WOCHENSCHRIFT, 2743 (2014). 
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R10). 
 
While it might seem odd at first sight that the decisions of the Federal Social Court led 
to a legislative change in the regulations regarding the legal profession, the reason for 
this peculiarity lies in the exemption from the statutory pension obligation for lawyers. 
According to § 6 (1) no. 1 Volume VI of the Social Insurance Code a lawyer can be ex-
empt from such obligation and instead be a member of the lawyers’ pension fund. This 
is generally considered to be preferable to the statutory pension scheme. The members 
of the lawyers’ pension fund pay a certain percentage of their income which is oriented 
on the contribution rate of the statutory pension scheme. While the latter generates the 
pensions of its members by way of an apportionment procedure, the lawyers’ pension 
fund achieves higher returns by means of capital-forming investments. 
 
In the above-mentioned decisions, the Federal Social Court held that the status of an in-
house counsel was not comparable to the occupational profile of a lawyer as required by 
the Federal Lawyers’ Act with its accompanying professional duties.  
The reaction to the ruling were controversial. While some would have preferred to have 
the issue dealt with in social legislation11, especially the Federal Association of In-house 
counsels and other interest groups strongly supported a regulation in the Federal Law-
yers’ Act12. The legislator finally opted for the latter option and incorporated the occu-
pational field of an in-house counsel in the Act. 
 
B. The Federal Lawyers’ Act of 2016 
 
The new Act came into force by 1 January 2016. Apart from the content-related changes, 
the law introduced a linguistic alteration. In its § 46 (2) Federal Lawyers’ Act the term 
‘in-house lawyer’ is now used to emphasize the new status. The new regulations stipu-
late that in-house lawyers are lawyers within the scope of the Act and as such have to 
adhere to the same standards of professional conduct that an independent lawyer has to 
uphold. The new Act outlines the necessity that the in-house lawyer’s occupation must 
be characterized by professional independence, cf. § 46 (3) Federal Lawyers’ Act. In addi-
tion to this content-related requirement, the Act provides for a formal condition, name-
ly the admission to the bar, §§ 46 (2), 46 a Federal Lawyers’ Act. The local bar associa-
tion will decide about the applicant’s request to be admitted as an in-house lawyer and 
grant the request if the in-house lawyer fulfills the general requirements to be admitted 			
10
  BSG: Keine Befreiung von der gesetzlichen Rentenversicherungspflicht für Syndikusanwälte (hier: Vorstands-
referent) und Compliance, 39, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTS- UND BANKRECHT, 1883 (2014). 
11
  Reinhard Singer, Advisory opinion on the legislative draft on the regulation of the legal profession of in-house 
lawyers 5 (Jan. 15, 2017, 5:17 PM), see: 
(https://www.bundestag.de/blob/381030/2dc3a0b17d11cae3bd98979b8b7671c1/singer-data.pdf). 
12
  Federal Association of In-house counsels, Opinion on the position paper of the Federal Ministry of Justice 
and Consumer Protection 2 (Feb. 18, 2015) (http://www.buj.net/resources/Server/BUJ-
Stellungnahmen/BUJ_Stellungnahme_150218.pdf). 
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as a lawyer in the sense of § 4 Federal Lawyers’ Act, provided that no reasons for a rejec-
tion of an application for admission exist, § 7 Federal Lawyers’ Act, and the professional 
activity of the in-house lawyer complies with the standards set out in § 46 (2) - (5) Feder-
al Lawyers’ Act. Once the local bar association has decided about the in-house lawyer’s 
admission, the competent pension insurance institution is bound by this decision and 
has to decide correspondingly with regard to the exemption from the statutory pension 
scheme, § 46 a (2) Federal Lawyer’s Act. 
 
At the same time the new regulation did not significantly extend the in-house lawyer’s 
right to represent its employer in court. The in-house lawyer’s right to act for his em-
ployer in court is still limited to proceedings where representation by a lawyer is not 
mandatory, § 46 c (2) Federal Lawyer’s Act. The significant change in the Act does not 
concern the in-house lawyer in his function as an employee but rather his second occu-
pation as a lawyer. Contrary to the old regulation, the in-house lawyer may now, not in 
his position as in-house lawyer, but in his function as a lawyer represent his employer. 
This result can be inferred from § 46 c (2) Federal Lawyer’s Act by means of a contrario 
reasoning. This provision prohibits the representation in criminal or administrative 
offence proceedings. Neither in his function as an in-house lawyer nor within his poten-
tial second occupation as a lawyer may the in-house lawyer represent his employer or his 
employer’s employees, § 46 c (2) Federal Lawyers’ Act. In contrast to the old regulation, 
this provision does not stipulate a general prohibition for the in-house lawyer to act for 
his employer as a lawyer. Consequently, the employer can instruct his own in-house 
lawyer even in proceedings where representation as a lawyer is mandatory as long as he is 
formally instructed in his occupation as a lawyer. 
 
The above-mentioned provision contains also one of the inconsistencies and uncertain-
ties of the new regulation. The statutory definition of the in-house lawyer in § 46 (2) 
Federal Lawyer’s Act should not detract from the fact that there is still the possibility for 
legal professionals, who are employed by a company or corporate group and work in 
their legal departments, to retain the status of an in-house counsel - as before - without 
the in-house lawyer’s professional rights and obligations under the Federal Lawyers’ 
Act. These in-house counsels are not mentioned in § 46 c (2) Federal Lawyers’ Act 
which, consequently, does not apply to them. Provided the lawyer was not involved in 
the same matter within his occupation as an in-house counsel he can represent his em-
ployer or other employees in criminal or administrative offence proceedings within his 
second occupation as a lawyer.13 Exactly this difference in treatment is commonly men-
tioned as one of the inconsistencies the new regulation has created. 
 
			
13
  Martin Henssler & Christian Deckenbrock, Keine Zulassungspflicht für Alt-Syndizi mit gültigem Befreiungs-
bescheid, NEUE JURISTISCHEN WOCHENSCHRIFT, 1345, 1350 (2016). 
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IV. CORNERSTONES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
 
  The year 1987 marked a turning point for the regulation of the lawyers’ professional 
conduct in Germany. On 14 July 1987, the Federal Constitutional Court decided that the 
Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct by the Federal Bar Association could not sup-
plement the rather general provision in § 42 Federal Lawyers’ Act (old version). The 
Court held that the Code constitutes an interference with the constitutionally protected 
occupational freedom (cf. Art. 12 (1) Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany) 
and lacks the required democratic legitimization, in particular because the Federal Law-
yers’ Act at that time did not contain any provision that transferred the competence to 
issue regulations on professional conduct on the Federal Bar Association or any other 
interest group.14 
 
To comply with the decision of the Federal Constitutional Court the legislator incorpo-
rated the general standard for professional conduct as well as the possibility to supple-
ment this standard in a code of professional conduct given by the Statutory Assembly of 
the Federal Bar Association, see §§ 59b, 191a Federal Lawyers’ Act.15 The Statutory As-
sembly made use of authorization and agreed on Rules of Professional Practice for Law-
yers. 
 
As a general professional standard, the law stipulates in § 43 Federal Lawyers’ Act that a 
lawyer must practice his profession conscientiously. The following provision in § 43a 
Federal Lawyers’ Act lists a number of basic duties. The enumeration contains inter alia 
the lawyer’s obligation to professional secrecy and the prohibition to represent conflict-
ing interests. These duties as well as the prohibition to approach the other party apply 
for the in-house lawyer as well as any other lawyer.16 
 
In its §§ 113 ff. the Federal Lawyers’ Act deals with sanctions for breaches of duty by the 
Lawyers’ Disciplinary Court, which is the competent authority to decide about such 
offenses. These sanctions include warnings, fines or – for severe violations – even the 
exclusion from the legal profession, § 114 Federal Lawyers’ Act. 
V. POTENTIAL DIFFICULTIES FOR IN-HOUSE LAWYERS UNDER THE NEW 
ACT 
 
As mentioned before the in-house lawyer is subject to the general professional standards 
for lawyers. In-house lawyers are now challenged to structure their workplaces in a way 			
14
  BVerfGE, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT, 191 (1988). 
15
  WILHELM FEUERICH & DAG WEYLAND, COMMENTARY ON THE FEDERAL LAWYERS’ ACT § 43a para. 1 
(9th ed. 2016). 
16
  Christian Wolf, Sozialrechtliche, arbeitsrechtliche und berufsrechtliche Implikationen für den Syndikusrechts-
anwalt, BUNDESRECHTSANWALTSKAMMER-MITTEILUNGEN, 9 (2016). 
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that conforms to the standards set out by the law. While some problems might be solved 
by a new organizational structure within the in-house lawyer’s legal department, other 
might require a rework of the new Act by the legislator. In view of the above, independ-
ence, professional secrecy and potential inherent conflicts of interests shall be touched 
upon with regard to problems that in-house lawyers will likely encounter. 
 
A. Independence 
 
The legal profession is traditionally an independent one. Professional independence is 
the striking characteristic commonly associated with the legal profession. Inventing an 
in-house lawyer with the same professional duties as a regular attorney creates a legal 
minefield for this profession. The new regulation tries to harmonize the in-house law-
yer’s employment with the characteristic professional independence by stipulating that 
professional independence has to be - contractually and factually - ensured by the em-
ployer, cf. § 46 (4) Federal Lawyers’ Act. The law recognizes that personal independence 
is impossible for the in-house lawyer and instead deems it sufficient if he is professional-
ly independent. This has been aptly described as ‘independence within dependence’.17 
The delimitation issues seem to be endless in this contradictory legal framework. 
 
B. Professional secrecy 
 
Professional secrecy is one of the cornerstones of the legal profession. Strict secrecy be-
tween the lawyer and his client is essential to establish a relationship of trust.18 The re-
spective provision within the Federal Lawyers’ Act can be found in § 43 (2) as well as in § 
2 Rules of Professional Practice for Lawyers. In order to effectively enforce professional 
secrecy, the law provides several provisions to safeguard confidentiality within the pro-
fessional relationship between the lawyer and his client. On the one hand violating the 
obligation of professional secrecy constitutes a criminal offence, § 203 (1) no. 3 Criminal 
Code, on the other hand the lawyer has the right to refuse to give evidence (§ 53 (1) no. 3 
Code of Criminal Procedure; § 383 (1) no. 6 Code of Civil Procedure; § 84 (1) Code of 
Procedure of Fiscal Courts, § 102 Fiscal Code). The common objective of these provision 
is to protect the professional relationship between lawyer and client.19 
 
Since the new regulation came into effect, the rules regarding professional secrecy in the 
Federal Lawyers’ Act and the Rules of Professional Practice for Lawyers apply to in-
house lawyers as well. They have to keep information which has become known to them 
in their professional practice confidential. The evident problem in this context is to 			
17
  Volker Römermann & Tim Günther, Syndikusrechtsanwalt – der (un)abhängige Rechtsallrounder mit der 
besonderen Lizenz, NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR ARBEITSRECHT, 71, 72 (2016). 
18
  Martin Henssler, Das anwaltliche Berufsgeheimnis, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT, 1817 (1994). 
19
  BVerfGE, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT, 1305 (2004); WILHELM FEUERICH & DAG WEYLAND, 
COMMENTARY ON THE FEDERAL LAWYERS’ ACT § 43a para. 12 (9th ed. 2016); VOLKER RÖMERMANN, 
COMMENTARY ON THE FEDERAL LAWYERS’ ACT § 43a para. 32 (12th ed. 2016). 
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exactly define the attorney-client-relationship. At first glance, the professional relation-
ship will be established between the in-house lawyer and the respective employer bind-
ing the in-house lawyer to secrecy. The situation will become more complicated if the in-
house lawyer is not only advising his employer, but also subsidiaries within the corpo-
rate structure of the employer. Would the in-house lawyer be obligated to report to the 
management of the parent company about the legal problems and his advice to the 
management of the subsidiary? Does the attorney-client-relationship only exist between 
the employing company and the in-house lawyer or is it possible for the in-house lawyer 
to have several different clients in one corporation? Is the in-house lawyer in a legal de-
partment which advised several companies within a corporate group then forbidden to 
share information within said corporate structure? The legislator obviously did not 
envision such scenario which will be the unfortunate reality for many in-house lawyers 
under the new regulation. 
 
Furthermore, this obligation to uphold professional secrecy generally corresponds with 
the lawyer’s right to refuse to give evidence. However, the legal situation for the in-
house lawyer differs with respect to the kind of proceedings. In civil court proceedings as 
well as proceedings which refer to the respective rules in the Code of Civil Procedure the 
in-house lawyer may refuse to testify. The relevant provision can be found in § 383 (1) 
no. 6 Code of Civil Procedure which grants ‘[…] persons to whom facts are entrusted, 
by virtue of their office, profession or status, the nature of which mandates their confi-
dentiality, or the confidentiality of which is mandated by law, where their testimony 
would concern facts to which the confidentiality obligation refers’ a right to refuse tes-
timony. Correspondingly, professionals in the above-mentioned sense are under no 
obligation to provide or produce documents to the extent that they are entitled to refuse 
testimony, § 142 (2) Code of Civil Procedure. However, in criminal proceedings the 
situation is quite different. The in-house lawyer is neither entitled to refuse testimony, § 
53 (1) no. 3 Code of Criminal Procedure, nor is his correspondence privileged, § 97 Code 
of Criminal Procedure – irrespective of whether or not his professional activity includes 
typical attorney work like legal counseling or other business advice for his employer.20 
While one might name valid reasons for this difference in treatment particularly with 
regard to an effective law enforcement against large corporations, the law shows yet 
again an inconsistency the legislator has created by changing the professional regulations 
of in-house lawyers instead of amending social legislation to solve the initial problem. 
 
C. Conflict of interest 
 
The prohibition to represent conflicting interests can be found in § 43a (4) Federal Law-
yers’ Act. Its basis is the trustful relationship between the lawyer and his client, ensuring 
the independence of the lawyer and the public interest in his role in the administration 			
20
  JÜRGEN-PETER GRAF, COMMENTARY ON THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 53 para. 12 (26th ed. 
2016). 
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of justice. These objectives are inseparable and interconnected.21 The prohibition is fur-
ther regulated in § 3 (3) Rules of Professional Practice for Lawyers. Additionally, a viola-
tion could constitute a criminal offence, § 356 Criminal Code. These provisions have the 
common purpose to protect the individual and general trust in the legal profession.22 
Once the lawyer realizes that a conflict of interest occurs, he has to inform his clients 
immediately and must cease to act for all clients involved in the same matter, § 3 (4) 
Rules of Professional Practice for Lawyers. 
 
It is controversially discussed whether the conflict of interest has to be determined from 
a subjective or objective point of view. It is mostly assumed that the interest has to be 
determined subjectively according to the party’s intention. Even scholars, who favor an 
objective determination with respect to the various protective purposes of § 43a (4) Fed-
eral Lawyers’ Act, concede that such conflict can be resolved if the involved parties 
know about their different interests and still explicitly agree to be represented by the 
same lawyer. Consequently, despite their different starting point, both interpretations 
will ultimately lead to a similar result.23  
 
The in-house lawyer may legally advice and represent his employer in its legal matters, § 
46 (5) Federal Lawyers’ Act. The provision explicitly specifies that this includes legal 
matters of affiliated enterprises in the sense of § 15 Stock Corporation Act. To put it in 
rather harsh terms, one might say that a conflict of interest is immanent in such circum-
stances. 
 
The representation of one company itself might lead to difficulties with respect to the 
conflicting interest of the involved persons. In complex corporate matters the lawyer as 
well as the in-house lawyer needs to strictly distinguish whether he acts for the corpora-
tion, its shareholders, the executive management or even the supervisory board.24 If the 
in-house lawyer is employed to advise more than one company within one corporate 
group the risk of conflicting interests between these affiliates increases. 
 
The prohibition to represent conflicting interests does not only concern each individual 
lawyer but extends to all lawyers who are connected in a joint practice or even through 
shared office premises, § 3 (3) Rules of Professional Practice for Lawyers. The new Act as 
well as the Rules of Professional Practice for Lawyers remain silent on the question 
whether or not a legal department consisting of in-house lawyers are considered to be 
such joint practice. During the legislative process this question was raised by the Federal 
Bar Association in its opinion on the legislative draft. The Federal Bar Association ex-			
21
  BVerfGE, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT, 2520 (2003). 
22
  VOLKER RÖMERMANN, COMMENTARY ON THE FEDERAL LAWYERS’ ACT § 43a paras. 163 f. (12th ed. 2016). 
23
  VOLKER RÖMERMANN, COMMENTARY ON THE FEDERAL LAWYERS’ ACT § 43a paras. 181 ff. (12th ed. 
2016). 
24
  VOLKER RÖMERMANN, COMMENTARY ON THE FEDERAL LAWYERS’ ACT, § 43a para. 173 (12th ed. 2016). 
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pressed the view that legal departments must be treated the same way as the typical joint 
practice – the law firm.25 Consequently, the prohibition to represent conflicting inter-
ests would also concern the in-house lawyer’s colleagues within their joint practice and 
substantially complicate the organization and work in the legal departments of large 
corporations. Without considerably restructuring the work process in the legal depart-
ments (e.g. Chinese walls) or creating new positions in each company, compliance with 
the professional regulations seems almost impossible under the new legislation. 
 
These considerations show that the legislator seems to have paid little attention to the 
economic reality that in-house lawyers commonly not only act for one company, but for 
all companies within one corporate group. He himself will have to decide towards 
whom he feels obligated to maintain loyalty. In reality, one can hardly picture a situa-
tion where that internal conflict will not be resolved in favor of the employer paying the 
monthly salary. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
In view of the above, it appears that the legislator almost overeagerly reacted to the Fed-
eral Social Court’s ruling. Dismissing to solve a social law problem within the respective 
field of law and developing new regulations in less than two years seems attributable to 
the significant political interference of lobby groups who opted for such a solution. It 
seems that the legislator chose the path of least resistance. Amending the social securities 
laws might have led to much broader discussion with the stakeholders and would most 
likely have provoked a discussion about the principle question why certain profession, 
such as the legal profession and other independent professions, are exempt from the 
statutory pension scheme. 
 
Instead the legislator chose to change the regulations of the legal profession and, there-
by, created regulations that assign a different legal status to legal professionals, who are 
essentially doing the same work. The formal requirement of the admittance to the bar 
cannot distract from the fact that the in-house lawyer’s and the in-house counsel’s occu-
pation is hardly different. As a consequence of the new regulation, some legal profes-
sionals in the same legal department might be subject to professional regulations while 
their colleagues still operate under the old status of in-house counsel. This issue has 
raised the question whether legal professionals who fulfill the requirements set out by 
the law to be admitted as an in-house lawyer are obliged to make a request to that effect 
or if the admission is optional.26 			
25
  Federal Bar Association, Opinion No. 17/2015 on the Ministerial Draft for the regulation of the legal profes-
sion of in-house lawyers 7 (May 2015). 
26
  Martin Henssler & Christian Deckenbrock, Keine Zulassungspflicht für Alt-Syndizi mit gültigem Befreiungs-
bescheid, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT, 1345, 1349 (2016). 
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It will be the task of the legislator to answer this question as well as find a solution for 
the inconsistencies in the course of a review of the new regulations. 
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I. REVIEW OF “10 YEARS AFTER SIEMENS” 
 
   Marked by a major search measure by the Prosecuting Attorney Munich I in the “In-
vestigation Complex Siemens”, November 15, 2006 is not only a milestone for the public 
disclosure of one of the largest German investigations into suspected corruption, but 
also the start of a development/continued development of compliance measures not yet 
foreseeable at this time and concurrently of company-internal investigations, which as a 
repressive component form a necessary part of compliance measures in the company. 
 
Whereas the company-internal investigations initiated by the Siemens company group 
very quickly after disclosure of the accusations in Penal Law were still at this time “un-
charted territory” for the German investigation authorities, a “foreign body” in German 
investigation proceedings, this perception has changed fundamentally over the last 10 
years. 
 
Actually, company-internal investigations are no longer a “foreign body” in German 
investigation proceedings. In almost all major investigation proceedings in which re-
sponsibility of the company concerned in accordance with § 30 OWiG (Administrative 
Offense Act) is the focus internal investigations are now being conducted. In the majori-
ty of the cases, external law firms are hired for this. The legal admissibility of these 
measures has not yet been questioned2.  
The fact that this development has led to a new, lucrative field of activity in the legal 
counsel sector does not require any further explanation. In view of the intensity of time 
and manpower normally associated with company-internal investigations and the costs 
thereby incurred Stoffer3 even speaks of a “gold-digger attitude”. 
 
This is accompanied by what has now become innumerous publications from attorneys, 
academia and in some cases representatives of the judiciary4. The image of internal inves-
tigations being depicted is highly diverse and partly influenced by the respective role of 
the author in the investigation/penal proceedings. At times it seems as if a complete 
privatization of the German investigation proceedings is feared5. 			
2
  cf. on the general topic in detail: Renate Wimmer, in Wirtschafts- und Steuerstrafrecht, § 152 Marginal No. 
6ff. (Werner Leitner & Henning Rosenau, 1st. ed. 2017). 
3
  HANNAH STOFFER, WIE VIEL PRIVATISIERUNG »VERTRÄGT« DAS STRAFPROZESSUALE ERMITTLUNGS-
VERFAHREN? Marginal No. 902, (1st. ed. 2016). 
4
  cf. the academic literature references in Wirtschafts- und Steuerstrafrecht, § 152 Marginal No. 6ff. (Werner 
Leitner & Henning Rosenau, 1st. ed. 2017); further: Rolf Raum, Die Verwertung unternehmensinterner Er-
mittlungen, STRAFVERTEIDIGER FORUM, 395ff. (2012); Amr Sarhan, Unternehmensinterne Privatermittlun-
gen im Spannungsfeld zur strafprozessualen Aussagefreiheit, 12,  ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTS- UND 
STEUERSTRAFRECHT, 449ff. (2015). 
5
  Presentation by Attorney-at-law Dr. Anne Wehnert  on the occasion of the event of the Institute for Law 
and Finance “Economy, Criminal Law, Ethics (ECLE) – Third Symposium“, “Economy versus Law on the 	
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From the legal aspect company-internal investigations remain “foreign bodies” in Ger-
man penal proceedings. For, neither the Penal Procedure Ordinance nor the Adminis-
trative Offense Act mentions a word of this phenomenon. The legislator has not fol-
lowed the “power of the factual”, leaving the clarification of the open legal questions 
“imported” with the internal investigations to be resolved in legal practice. The fact that 
this is not easy at times, particularly within the context of an aspired uniformity of the 
legal order, will be proven. 
 
This situation is exacerbated by the draft of a law for the introduction of responsibility 
of companies and other associations of the state of North Rhine Westphalia under Penal 
Law6. § 5 Sect. 2 stipulates that the Court can desist from a penalty where the association 
significantly contributed toward detecting a penal offense by the association and pro-
vided the investigation authorities with evidence suitable for proving the offense as well 
took adequate organizational and human resources-related measures to prevent similar 
offenses by the association in future. This promotion of assistance with detection of the 
crime, which is essentially to be welcomed, and self-exoneration of the companies is 
likely to have as a consequence that the associations concerned conduct their own inves-
tigations with even greater intensity in order to enjoy freedom from prosecution. How-
ever, the draft of the law does not provide for the organization of company-internal 
investigations7. 
 
It presently remains an open-ended question whether the legislator ultimately will take a 
stance within the scope of any re-regulation of responsibility of associations under Penal 
Law/Administrative Offense law. 
II. HANDLING OF COMPANY-INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS BY THE INVES-
TIGATION AUTHORITIES 
 
   Legal practice is highly fragmented due to the fact that there have been no specific legal 
provisions on the handling of company-internal investigations. 
 
Unlawful, as they are in breach of the official investigations principle set out in § 152 
Sect. 2 StPO both are in my opinion extreme positions. The attitude of “sitting back and 
taking things easy” exhibited by public investigators frequently invoked in academic 			
Financial Market?“ on Nov. 20, 2010 in Frankfurt am Main; critical on internal investigations but more dif-
ferentiated: Klaus Leipold, Internal Investigations – Fluch und Segen zugleich?, FESTSCHRIFT FÜR WOLF 
SCHILLER, 418, (2014);  highly critical also HANNAH STOFFER, WIE VIEL PRIVATISIERUNG »VERTRÄGT« 
DAS STRAFPROZESSUALE ERMITTLUNGS-VERFAHREN?, Marginal No. 901ff, (1st. ed. 2016). 
6
  Presented on September 19th 2013. 
7
  cf. in detail Elisa Hoven et al.,  Der nordrhein-westfälische Entwurf eines Verbandsstrafgesetzes – Kritische 
Anmerkungen aus Wissenschaft und Praxis, Teil 2, 6,  NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTS-, WTEUER- 
UND UNTERNEHMENSSTRAFRECHT, 201ff. (2014). 
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literature8 and the suspension of all independent investigation activity in the case of 
announced company-internal investigations or even the demand thereof with reference 
to tight independent resources and the communication of detailed investigation orders  
is definitely in breach of § Sect. 152 para. 2 StPO. This does not do justice to the role of 
the prosecuting attorney as the “master of the investigation proceedings” and leads to a 
distorted establishment of truth. However, simply ignoring the results of internal inves-
tigations is not compatible with the official investigations principle either. Because the 
prosecuting attorney must exhaust all evidence available to him. This includes the re-
sults of private investigators. For example, it can be expedient for assessment of the cred-
ibility of a statement to consult records or notes on an internal interview with witness-
es/cross-examine the internal investigator as a witness. If necessary this can be asserted 
by force where there is no seizure prohibition or right to refuse testimony in the indi-
vidual case. 
 
There is no “one size fits all solution” as to how investigation authorities are to handle 
company-internal investigations. This depends on the situation and motivation of the 
initiation of the investigations (self-reporting on the basis of independent investigations 
already conducted, commissioning after disclosure of events in the company relevant in 
Penal Law by press reporting or search measures by the prosecuting attorney) as well as 
on the seriousness of the company’s intention to detect the offense. 
 
The judiciary, including the judicial administration, needs to meet the challenge of sen-
sible handling of company-internal investigations in light of the development depicted 
above. It is not helpful here to lament the “power of the factual” or to consider the pos-
sibility of prosecuting private investigators on grounds of unauthorized assumption of 
official authority (§ 132 StGB) as they usurp the public proceedings with an actual prece-
dence because they (initially) seize all key evidence using a high volume of personnel 
capacities/efficient technical means9. It would make more sense to consider clear statu-
tory regulations followed by internal investigations, answering the open questions of 
the influence of the internal investigations on the proceedings against the employees and 
bodies concerned. The fact that white collar crime can only be fought effectively with 
adequately trained expert personnel needs no further discussion. 
III. OPEN LEGAL QUESTIONS 
 
Company-internal investigations being alien to German penal proceedings, the legal 
user is confronted with the same legal questions for which neither the Penal Procedure 
Ordinance or Administrative Offense Act have a clear answer. There has not yet been 			
8
  cf. as an example: Presentation by Attorney-at-law Dr. Anne Wehnert on the occasion of the event of the 
Institute for Law and Finance “Economy, Criminal Law, Ethics (ECLE) – Third Symposium”, “Economy 
versus Law on the Financial Market”?“ on Nov. 20, 2010 in Frankfurt am Main. 
9
  But this is argued by HANNAH STOFFER, WIE VIEL PRIVATISIERUNG »VERTRÄGT« DAS STRAFPRO-
ZESSUALE ERMITTLUNGSVERFAHREN?, Marginal No. 911, (1st. ed. 2016). 
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any ruling by a higher court or even by the Supreme Court. 
 
A. Seizure of results of company-internal investigations 
 
As discussed, it can be expedient in accordance with the official investigation principle 
to consult documents from company-internal investigations, where necessary using 
means of force. However, the prerequisite for this is that the documents be subject to 
seizure. 
 
1. Seizure in the company affected 
 
In the companies affected the results of company-internal investigations may only be 
subject to a seizure prohibition if they are defense documents as defined by § 148 StPO. 
Defense documents are exempt from seizure beyond the wording of § 97 Sect. Clause 2 
StPO  where they are being kept by the defendant. The same applies to the company 
affected as an ancillary party via § 444 Sect. 2 Clause 2, § 432 Sect. 2, § 434 Sect. 2 Clause. 
2 StPO10. 
 
The fact that internal investigations commissioned by the company cannot be any de-
fense documents by the employee or body requires no further discussion. The objective 
of self-investigations by the company is normally also detection of misconduct by the 
employee or body who may later become the defendant in public investigation proceed-
ings in order to take corresponding legal steps against him. To classify these documents 
as defense documents of the employee or body would be a contradiction and put the 
investigator in an unresolvable conflict of interest11. 
 
The question is more nuanced in the case of the ancillary participation of the company. 
Here the company can invoke the rights of the defendant from the Penal Procedure 			
10
  Klaus Rogall in: KARLSRUHER KOMMENTAR ZUM GESETZ ÜBER ORDNUNGSWIDRIGKEITEN, §30 Margi-
nal No. 209, (4th ed. 2014); Frank Peter Schuster, LG Mannheim, 3. 7. 2012 - 24 Qs 1/12; 24 Qs 2/12: Beurtei-
lung der Beschlagnahmefreiheit von Unterlagen im Gewahrsam eines Zeugen vorrangig nach § 97 Abs.2 StPO, 
11, NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTS-, STEUER- UND UNTERNEHMENSSTRAFRECHT, 424 ff. (2012); 
Alexander von Saucken, Zur Beschlagnahmefreiheit von Unterlagen im Gewahrsam eines Zeugen nach §§ 
160a, 97 Abs. 2 StPO, JOURNAL DER WIRTSCHAFTSSTRAFRECHTLICHEN VEREINIGUNG E.V., 1 (2013); Re-
nate Wimmer, „Gesetzliche Privilegierung“ von internal investigations durch externe Kanzleien?, JOURNAL 
DER WIRTSCHAFTSSTRAFRECHTLICHEN VEREINIGUNG E.V., 2 (2013); cf. also Werner Leitner, Die Neben-
beteiligung des Unternehmens – Das Unternehmensmandat als Verteidigungsverhältnis,  Unternehmensstraf-
recht – Festschrift für Jürgen Wessing, 149ff. (Heiko Ahlbrecht et al. 2015); without substantiation  Se-
rini/Witzigmann, in Handbuch für den Staatsanwalt (Helmut Vordermayer & Bernd v. Heintschel-Heinegg 
5th ed. 2016) 2nd part Chapter, 595f. generally reject a right of silence by the association concerned referring to 
the Supreme Court ruling of Jan. 23,2014 – KRB 48/13. This cannot be concluded from the cited ruling 
which refers exclusively to the information by the association as set out in §§81 a Sect. 1 and Sect. 2 GWB and 
is contrary to the law that concedes the company a right of silence at least under ordinary law (cf. Klaus Ro-
gall in: KARLSRUHER KOMMENTAR ZUM GESETZ ÜBER ORDNUNGSWIDRIGKEITEN, § 30 Marginal No. 209, 
(4th ed. 2014)). 
11
  cf. here District Court of Hamburg, ruling of October 15, 2015  – 608 Qs 18/10, NJW 2011, 942. 
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Ordinance according to § 444 Sect. 2 Clause 2, § 432 Sect. 2, § 434 Sect. 1 Clause 2 StPO 
and accordingly refuse the release of defense documents as defined in § 148 StPO. 
  
The assessment whether there are defense documents as defined by § 148 StPO depends 
on a chronological and substance-related component. 
 
From the chronological aspect the question arises whether documents already prepared 
before initiation of the proceedings could constitute defense documents. This is assessed 
differently in rulings by municipal courts and in academic literature. The Municipal 
Courts of Gießen and Braunschweig are very extensive in their rulings of June 25, 201212 
– 7 Qs 100/12 – resp. July 21, 201513 – 6 Qs 116/15. According to these, documents which 
were prepared well in advance of the knowledge of the incriminating facts by the public 
investigators could constitute defense documents. Large portions of academic literature 
follow this opinion14. This cannot be followed just as little as can the highly formalistic 
opinion by the Municipal Court of Bonn which seems to rely in its ruling of June 21, 
201215 - 27 Qs 2/12 – on the date on which the proceedings were formally initiated by the 
investigation officials. § 97 StPO presupposes the defendant character as defined by the 
Penal Procedure Ordinance and a subsequent associated defense relationship16. Howev-
er, it is not relevant here when the prosecution attorneys formally initiated the proceed-
ings but when they should have done it, i.e. the time at which an initial suspicion of 
responsibility pursuant to §30 OWG should have formed from the perspective and sta-
tus of knowledge of the prosecuting attorney. 
 
Whether company-internal investigations represent defense documents, from the sub-
stance-related aspect  as defined by § 148 StPO cannot be generally assessed but is always 
subject to individual review. The time of commissioning, the specific content of the 
investigation assignment/ documents are relevant here. 
 
However, in no case are documents which were not produced by the protected relation-
ship of trust, i.e. business documents submitted to the investigator for conducting the 			
12
  LG Gießen , Beschluss vom 25.06.2012 – 7 Qs 100/12 : Beschlagnahmeverbot für Verteidigungsunterlagen, 
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTS- UND STEUERSTRAFRECHT, 409ff. (2012). 
13
  LG Braunschweig , Beschluss vom 21.07.2015 – 6 Qs 116/15 : Verteidigungsunterlagen und interne Ermittlun-
gen, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTS- UND STEUERSTRAFRECHT, 40ff. (2016). 
14
  cf. exemplary: Reinhard Michalke, Verteidigungsunterlagen sind auch vor Einleitung eines förmlichen Er-
mittlungsverfahrens geschützt, 1, JOURNAL DER WIRTSCHAFTSSTRAFRECHTLICHEN VEREINIGUNG E.V. 
(2013); Bastian Mehle & Volkmar Mehle, Beschlagnahmefreiheit von Verteidigungsunterlagen – insbesondere 
in Kartellbußgeldverfahren, 23, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT, 1639 (2011); Emanuel H. F. Ballo, LG 
Braunschweig vom 21.07.2015 – 6 Qs 116/15 – Verteidigungsunterlagen und interne Ermittlungen, ZEIT-
SCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTS- UND STEUERSTRAFRECHT,43 (2016). 
15
  Matthias Jahn & Stefan Kirsch, Kartellrechtliches Ermittlungsverfahren, 1, NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRT-
SCHAFTS-, STEUER- UND UNTERNEHMENSSTRAFRECHT, 21 (2013). 
16
  Betram Schmitt, in Strafprozessordnung, § 97 Marginal No. 36 (Lutz Meyer-Goßner & Betram Schmitt 59th 
ed. 2016). 
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internal investigation, exempt from seizure. In this sense the Municipal Court of Gießen 
exempts the documents which “do not specifically concern the defense relationship”, 
“but general accounting documents/letters to third parties” from seizure in its ruling of 
June 25, 201217. The statements by the Municipal Court of Braunschweig in its ruling of 
July 21, 201518 follow the same line. 
 
2. Seizure by the external investigator 
 
Where documents are to be seized from company-internal investigations by an external 
law firm hired for the purpose the Municipal Court of Mannheim in its ruling of July 3, 
201219 - 24 Qs 1/12 – as well as the vast proportion of academic literature20  assumes ex-
emption from seizure with regard to § 160a StPO new version even in investigation pro-
ceedings against an employee or body. 
 
This cannot be followed with the convincing arguments by the Municipal Court of 
Hamburg in its ruling of October 15, 201021 - 608 Qs 18/10, which continues to be valid 
even after the new version of § 160a StPO22. 
 
§ 160a Sect. 5 StPO in the version applicable since Feb. 1, 2011 with which attorneys in the 
absolute area of protection of § 160a Sect. 1 StPO were included beyond the defense 
attorney continues to assume precedence of § 97 StPO over § 160a StPO as lex specialis. 
Due to this ranking the District Court of Hamburg assumed exemption of seizure with 			
17
 LG Gießen, Beschluss vom 25.06.2012 – 7 Qs 100/12 : Beschlagnahmeverbot für Verteidigungsunterlagen, 
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTS- UND STEUERSTRAFRECHT, 409ff. (2012). 
18
  LG Braunschweig , Beschluss vom 21.07.2015 – 6 Qs 116/15 : Verteidigungsunterlagen und interne Ermittlun-
gen, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTS- UND STEUERSTRAFRECHT, 40ff. (2016). 
19
  Frank Peter Schuster, LG Mannheim, 3. 7. 2012 - 24 Qs 1/12; 24 Qs 2/12: Beurteilung der Beschlagnahmefrei-
heit von Unterlagen im Gewahrsam eines Zeugen vorrangig nach § 97 Abs.2 StPO, 11, NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT 
FÜR WIRTSCHAFTS-, STEUER- UND UNTERNEHMENSSTRAFRECHT, 424 ff. (2012). 
20
  cf.  as an example: Tido Park, Schutz der im Rahmen von unternehmensinternen Untersuchungen gewonne-
nen Informationen vor behördlicher Beschlagnahme nach deutschem Recht, JOURNAL FÜR STRAFRECHT, 20 
(2014); Margarete Gräfin v. Galen, LG Hamburg, 15. 10. 2010 - 608 Qs 18/10: Beschlagnahme von Inter-
viewprotokollen nach „Internal Investigations” – HSH Nordbank, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT, 
942 (2011); Matthias Jahn & Stefan Kirsch, Anmerkung zu LG Hamburg, Beschluss v. 15.10.2010 – 608 Qs 
18/10, 3, Strafverteidiger, 151 (2011), Thomas C. Knierim, LG Hamburg: Beschlagnahmefähigkeit von Grund-
lagen eines Rechtsgutachtens, FACHDIENST STRAFRECHT, 314177 (2011); Frank Peter Schuster, LG Mann-
heim, 3. 7. 2012 - 24 Qs 1/12; 24 Qs 2/12: Beurteilung der Beschlagnahmefreiheit von Unterlagen im Gewahr-
sam eines Zeugen vorrangig nach § 97 Abs.2 StPO, 11, NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTS-, STEUER- 
UND UNTERNEHMENSSTRAFRECHT, 424 (2012); Emanuel H. F. Ballo, Beschlagnahmeschutz im Rahmen 
von Internal Investigations – Zur Reichweite und Grenze des § 160a StPO, 2,  NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
WIRTSCHAFTS-, STEUER- UND UNTERNEHMENSSTRAFRECHT, 46 (2013). 
21
  Margarete Gräfin v. Galen, LG Hamburg, 15. 10. 2010 - 608 Qs 18/10: Beschlagnahme von Interviewprotokollen 
nach „Internal Investigations” – HSH Nordbank, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT, 942 (2011). 
22
  Cf. here also: Renate Wimmer, „Gesetzliche Privilegierung“ von internal investigations durch externe Kanzlei-
en?, JOURNAL DER WIRTSCHAFTSSTRAFRECHTLICHEN VEREINIGUNG E.V., 2 (2013). 
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convincing ratio decidendi in its ruling of October 15, 2010. §97 StPO only protects the 
relationship of the accused and party subject to professional secrecy. There is no rela-
tionship similar to a retainer or  a retainer per se between the external investigator and 
the body or employee.  Nothing is to be added to this. A different result could only be 
justified if one were to take a minority opinion23  that § 97 StPO  does not only apply 
with regard to the accused party in the respective penal and investigation proceedings.  
With regard to the unambiguous adjudication by the Federal Constitutional Court24 
this is not convincing25. 
 
However, something else would have to apply with regard to § 444 Sect. 2 Clause. 2, § 
432 Sect. 2, § 434 Sect. 1 Clause 1 StPO where the company is an “affected party” in § 30 
OWiG proceedings. The company can invoke the defendant rights of the Penal Proce-
dure Ordinace as well as protection from seizure under § 97 StPO in this case. The con-
trary stance sometimes taken by the public investigators is to be rejected and is not justi-
fied on the basis of the ruling by the Federal Constitutional Court of February 26, 
200926 - 1 BvR 2172/96. The Federal Constitutional Court merely concludes therein that 
the legal entity does not need to be granted exemption from self-incrimination from the 
constitutional aspect. However this does not prevent the legislator from conceding the 
association this right on the basis of ordinary law. The ruling by the Supreme Court of 
Jan. 23, 201427 – KRB 48/13 – specified in this context does not justify denial of the right 
of silence either. The ruling by the anti-trust senate refers exclusivley to the information 
by the association as set out in §§ 81 a Sect.1 and Sect. 2 GWB. (Act Against Restraints on 
Competition). Here an exception from the right of the association to not have to in-
criminate itself is regulated with regard to the facts necessary for determining the 
amount of the fine (§ 81 Sect. 4 Clause 2, 3 GWB). 
 
B. Validity of self-incriminating information 
 
Investigation and disclosure can be of decisive, often existential significance for the 
company not only de lege ferenda, but also de lege lata with regard to the bonus system 
in Anti-trust Law. The interest of the association in a complete and rapid clarification of 
the facts of the case, also through questioning of the employees concerned, is in conflict 
with its interest not to incriminate itself with detrimental facts. 
 
The solution approaches for solving this conflict of interest mostly have only a possible 			
23
  Cf.:  Renate Wimmer, Die Verwertung unternehmensinterner Untersuchungen – Aufgabe oder Durchsetzung 
des Legalitätsprinzips? Festschrift für Imme Roxin, 544 (Lorenz Schulz et al. 2012). 
24
  BVerfG, Ruling of October 27, – 2 BvR 2211/00, NStZ-RR 2004, 83 ff. 
25
  Cf. Renate Wimmer, Die Verwertung unternehmensinterner Untersuchungen – Aufgabe oder Durchsetzung 
des Legalitätsprinzips? Festschrift für Imme Roxin, 544 (Lorenz Schulz et al. 2012). 
26
  BVerfGE 95, 220ff.  
27
  NZKart 2014, 236ff. 
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investigation by the prosecuting attorney as a negative consequence for the employee. A 
vast proportion of academic literature28 – predominantly invoking the joint and several 
debtor ruling by the Federal Constitution Court29 – assumes with regard to the nemo-
tenetur principle resulting from Art. 2 in conjunction with Art 1 Sect. 1 GG (Basic Law) 
that self-incriminating information by the subsequent defendant in public investigation 
proceedings are subject to a prohibition of use or exploitation as evidence. Already from 
the dogmatic aspect this is not convincing, as the nemo-tenetur principle only protects 
against compulsory public self-incrimination and essentially does not apply to private 
law situations. A comparison of the handling of self-incriminating information in other 
legal situations shows that the law has always assumed it is usable in investigation or 
penal proceedings if it was not provided on the basis of a statutory duty30 (e.g. in the 
case of self-incriminating information in civil proceedings or toward a third partly liabil-
ity insurer). In the case of company-internal investigations the latter are conducted on 
the basis of a self-incrimination duty from the private law employment relationship 
according to rulings by the Employment Court. Taking into account the result just now 
elaborated that only a statutory information duty leads to prohibition of use, the latter 
does not apply to self-incriminating information in company-internal investigations. 
 
There may be a case in which the private investigations are to be allocated to public in-
vestigators, for instance, where in order to circumvent the nemo-tenetur examination of 
witnesses who may become defendants the public investigators deliberately transfer the 
case to the private investigators. However, such constellations tend to be the exception. 
The very exhaustive allocation of the internal investigations to the public authorities 
made in parts of academic literature for example because the company cooperates with 
the investigators and they have raised the prospect of a mitigation of the penalty in the 
case of internal solution of the case31 is not convincing. Because taking into account in-
ternal solution of the case is a compulsory allocation criterion as a post-offense action 
pursuant to § 17 Sect. 3 OWiG, i.e. the investigators and the courts must already take 
into account  de lege lata a serious internal solution of the case by the company. Consist-
ently pursuing this concept, every case of positive post-offense behavior within the con-
text of setting the extent of the penalty would be allocable to the public investigators. 
De lege ferenda regarding the possibility of an association being exempt from prosecu-
tion in the case of independent solution of the case under certain circumstances  in § 5 of 			
28
  Cf. the detailed presentation of the opinions represented in academic literature Renate Wimmer, Die Ver-
wertung unternehmensinterner Untersuchungen – Aufgabe oder Durchsetzung des Legalitätsprinzips Fest-
schrift für Imme Roxin, 544ff. (Lorenz Schulz et al. 2012); and Renate Wimmer, in Wirtschafts- und Steuer-
strafrecht, § 152 Marginal No. 22 (Werner Leitner & Henning Rosenau 1st. ed. 2017). 
29
  Ruling of January 13, 1981 – 1 BvR 116/77. NJW 1981, 1431ff. 
30
  cf. in detail: Renate Wimmer, Die Verwertung unternehmensinterner Untersuchungen – Aufgabe oder 
Durchsetzung des Legalitätsprinzips? Festschrift für Imme Roxin, 548ff. (Lorenz Schulz et al. 2012 and Renate 
Wimmer, in Wirtschafts- und Steuerstrafrecht, § 152 Marginal No. 23ff. (Werner Leitner & Henning Ro-
senau 1st. ed. 2017). 
31
  HANNAH STOFFER, WIE VIEL PRIVATISIERUNG »VERTRÄGT« DAS STRAFPROZESSUALE ERMITTLUNGS-
VERFAHREN?, Marginal No. 938ff., (1st. ed. 2016). 
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the draft of a law to introduce liability of companies and other associations of the state 
of North Rhine Westphalia under penal law the same would apply. 
 
The solution approach on the fair trial principle based on Art. 6 EMRK for instance in 
the case of the exercise of undue force or deception in order to attain a prohibition of 
use32 is more convincing. However, due to the lack of statuory binding provisions on the 
organization of company-internal investigations it is difficult to define when unfair 
proceedings start. 
 
Both solution approaches only take Penal Law into consideration and do not answer the 
question as to how the employee with self-incriminating information is to be dealt with 
for example within the framework of proceedings against unfair dismissal or damage 
compensation. 
 
Hence, in my opinion it would be expedient to reconsider de legal lata the employee’s 
duty under Employment Law to incriminate himself, as is the case in an increasing share 
of academic literature. 
 
De lege ferenda a statutory provision not only on the issue of the validity of self-
incriminating information but also on a minimum standard which internal investiga-
tions need to meet in order to enable the company affected a penalty mitigation or even 
exemption from prosecution in accordance with the draft of the law would be desirable. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
  The development triggered by the “corruption case Siemens” in Germany, which al-
lows the observation of company-internal investigations in almost all major investiga-
tion proceedings focusing on the imposition of a fine on an association seems unstop-
pable. The legislator and judiciary need to meet this challenge and should guarantee fair 
results with an equitable statutory regulation and responsible handling of the cases 
which comply with both the public (and company’s) interest in solution of the case but 
also account for the rights of the individual defendants. Solution approaches to counter 
“negative spin-offs” with criminalization of the internal investigators on grounds of 
unauthorized assumption of authority or coercion to not seem to be sensible or harbor 
prospects of success. 
			
32
  As argued in Christoph Knauer & Michael Gaul, Internal investigations und fair trial – Überlegungen zu 
einer Anwendung des Fairnessgedankens, 4,  NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR STRAFRECHT, 193 (2013).  
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1
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I. LIMITLESS CRIMINAL BUSINESS LAW AND THE REACTION OF BUSI-
NESSES 
 
A. Evolution of Criminal Business Law 
 
   In Western countries, Criminal Business Law has evolved with increasing momentum 
from an ameba into a dinosaur.2 Whereas in 1949 Edwin Sutherland still posed the ques-
tion as to whether deviant behavior in business is labeled as “crime” and falls under the 
jurisdiction of Criminal Law,3 today businesses and the crimes of powerful economic 
agents are at the focus of public investigations and the public interest.4 
 
The starting points for this are instances of re-criminalization and a stricter application of 
substantive Criminal Business Law.5   The latter affect all subsectors of the economy in 
the already highly-regulated markets.6  A general point of focus is the fight against cor-
ruption.  In Germany too, criminal liability loopholes are currently being closed7 and 
through implementation of an “overseas clause” the German legislator purports to be the 			
2  White Collar Crime Act of 1949 (WiGBl. 1949, 193), Act Against the Restriction of Competition 1957 (BGBl. I 
1957, 2114), White Collar Crime Prevention Acts of 1976/1986 (First White Collar Crime Prevention Act of July 
29, 1976 (BGBl. I, 2034), Second White Collar Crime Prevention Act of May 15, 1986, (BGBl I, 721)), Securities 
Trading Act 1994 (BGBl. I 1994, 1759), Anti-Corruption Act of 1997 (BGBl. I 1997, 2038), Anti-Tax Evasion 
Act of 2001 (BGBl. I 2001, 3922). 
3  cf. Edwin H. Sutherland, Is White Collar Crime Crime? In: White Collar Crime, 29 ff. (Edwin H. Sutherland 
1949). 
4  The ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR INTERNATIONALE STRAFRECHTSDOGMATIK also dealt with the subject in its 10 
years, cf. only: Matthias Jahn, Die verfassungskonforme Auslegung des § 97 Abs. 1 Nr. 3 StPO, ZEITSCHRIFT 
FÜR INTERNATIONALE STRAFRECHTSDOGMATIK, 453 (2011); Carsten Momsen, Internal Investigations zwi-
schen arbeitsrechtlicher Mitwirkungspflicht und strafprozessualer Selbstbelastungsfreiheit, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
INTERNATIONALE STRAFRECHTSDOGMATIK, 508 (2011); Frank Peter Schuster, Verwertbarkeit von Beweis-
mitteln bei grenzüberschreitender Strafverfolgung, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR INTERNATIONALE STRAFRECHTSDOG-
MATIK, 68 (2010); Hans Theile, Die Herausbildung normativer Orientierungsmuster für Internal Investigati-
ons – am Beispiel selbstbelastender Aussagen, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR INTERNATIONALE STRAFRECHTSDOGMA-
TIK, 378 (2013). 
5  Forerunner: Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 (SOX). cf. also the US Federal statutes “Mail Fraud Statute” (2012), 
“Wire Fraud Statue” (2012), and “Anti-Kickback Act” (2012), which also are for the purpose of battling cor-
ruption, for more details: Jeffrey Boles, Examining the lax treatment of commercial bribary in the united states: 
A prescription for reform, AMERICAN BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL, 119 (2014); as well as in general regarding 
expansion of US Criminal Business Law: Lucian E. Dervan, International White Collar Crime and the Glob-
alization of internal Investigations, FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL, 361, 363 f. (2011). Further Physician 
Payments Sunshine Act 2010, which contains prior offenses and provides for a duty of reporting to the relevant 
authorities with regard to donations of the pharmaceutical industry to Health Care Professionals which is sub-
ject to penalty upon violation. 
6  Parallel to this development, a hyphenation effect has formed, e.g. Employment-Criminal Law, Capital Mar-
kets-Criminal Law, Medical-Criminal Law (Business Criminal Law for the doctor), Anti-trust-Criminal Law, 
Pharmaceuticals-Criminal Law, Environmental-Criminal Law. 
7  Introduction of § 299a StGB, Reform of § 299 StGB, in detail: Hendrik Schneider, Sonderstrafrecht für Ärzte? 
Eine kritische Analyse der jüngsten Gesetzentwürfe zur Bestrafung der „Ärztekorruption“, ONLINEZEIT-
SCHRIFT FÜR HÖCHSTRICHTERLICHE RECHTSPRECHUNG ZUM STRAFRECHT, 473 (2013). 
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guardian of foreign competition orders.8  It is well known that the reach of US criminal 
law has been extended since the FCPA was passed in 1977.9 
 
The same applies to the introduction of the UK Bribery Act on July 1, 201110, whose “of-
fences” are so vague that the Ministry of Justice published guidelines for application of 
the law setting the perimeters of the new law for the businesses.11 
 
Parallel to this, the risks of detection for occupational and corporate crime12 have in-
creased. A key role in this context is played by whistleblowing, which was taken to the 
extreme through Sec. 922 of the Dodd-Frank Act13, but after having transcended initial 
resentment14 is also increasingly being applied in Germany as a measure to make crime 
more visible and as a bottom up instrument of sustainable compliance.15 
 
Ever since Enron and WorldCom in 2001 and 2002 and the subprime crisis in 200716 pub-
lic opinion, which is the forerunner and pacesetter (buzzword: “political-journalistic re-
inforcement cycle”17) of punitive criminal law policy in the area of Criminal Business Law, 
has changed. Introduction of the SOX in 2002 was accompanied by the words of then 			
8  Günter Heine & Jörg Eisele, in Strafgesetzbuch, § 299 No. 29a StGB (Adolf Schönke & Horst Schröder 29th 
ed. 2015); Gerhard Dannecker, in Strafgesetzbuch Bd.3, § 299 StGB, No. 74 (Urs Kindhäuser, Ulfrid Neumann 
& Hans-Ullrich Paeffgen, 4th ed. 2013). 
9 Regarding the historical context of the FCPA, cf. Hendrik Schneider, in Wirtschaftsstrafrecht, § 3 No. 498 
(Hauke Brettel & Hendrik Schneider 1st ed. 2014), as well as in detail Hartmut Berghoff, From the Watergate 
Scandal to the Compliance Revolution: The Fight against Corporate Corruption in the United States and Ger-
many, BULLETIN OF THE GHI, 7 (2013); for a historical overview of the expansion of US Criminal Law see: 
Lucian E. Dervan, International White Collar Crime and the Globalization of internal Investigations, FORD-
HAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL, 361, 363 f. (2011). 
10  Jochen Deister & Anton Geier, Der UK Bribery Act 2010 und seine Auswirkungen auf deutsche Unternehmen, 
CORPORATE COMPLIANCE ZEITSCHRIFT, 12 (2011). 
11  Jochen Deister & Anton Geier, Der UK Bribery Act 2010 und seine Auswirkungen auf deutsche Unternehmen, 
CORPORATE COMPLIANCE ZEITSCHRIFT, 81 (2011). 
12  MARSHALL R. CLINARD & RICHARD QUINNEY, CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR SYSTEMS: A TYPOLOGY, 130 ff. 
(1967). 
13  The entire text of Section 922 can be retrieved at https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/dodd-frank-sec-
922.; cf. also: Caitlin Hickey, Incentivizing Whistleblowing in the United States Qui Tam, Anti-Retaliation and 
Cash-For-Information, NEUE KRIMINALPOLITIK, 388 (2015). 
14  Exemplary here Thomas Lampert, in Corporate Compliance: Handbuch der Haftungsvermeidung im Unter-
nehmen, § 9 No. 35 (Christoph E. Hauschka et al. 2nd ed. 2010); Frank Maschmann, in Handbuch der Kor-
ruptionsprävention, 138 ff. No. 125 ff. (Dieter Dölling et al. 2007); regarding the status of the Rotsch debate, 
Criminal Compliance, § 2 Rn. 28 ff. (Thomas Rotsch 2015). 
15  ESTHER PITTROFF, WHISTLE-BLOWING-SYSTEME IN DEUTSCHEN UNTERNEHMEN EINE UNTERSUCHUNG 
ZUR WAHRNEHMUNG UND IMPLEMENTIERUNG (2011); HENDRIK SCHNEIDER & DIETER JOHN, DAS UN-
TERNEHMEN ALS OPFER VON WIRTSCHAFTSKRIMINALITÄT (2013).  
16  Regarding the analysis of international criminology against the backdrop of the subprime crisis, Hendrik 
Schneider, in Festschrift für Wolfgang Heinz 661, (Eric Hilgendorf & Rudolf Rengier 2012). 
17  Sebastian Scheerer, Der politisch publizistische Verstärkerkreislauf. Zur Beeinflussung der Massenmedien im 
Prozess strafrechtlicher Normgenese, KRIMINOLOGISCHES JOURNAL, 223 (1978). (Analysis of International 
Criminology Against the Backdrop of the Subprime Crisis). 
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President George W. Bush: “The era of low standards and false profits is over ... no board-
room in America is above or beyond the law... No more easy money for corporate crimi-
nals, just hard time.''18 These statements were backed by creation of a Corporate Fraud 
Task Force to step up the intensity of prosecution of white collar crime.19  
 
In Germany as well, there are predominant calls for stricter prosecution of white collar 
criminals and “tax evaders”. Criminal law experts, criminologists,20 practitioners, politi-
cians21 and other economic agents22 predominantly support this process. They participate 
in public discourse as moral entrepreneurs23. They demand strict measures,24 advocate the 
extensive interpretation of existing regulations on grounds of Criminal Law policy,25 
scandalize the violation of norms,26 demonize perpetrator legal entities27 and regard the 			
18  Elisabeth Bumiller, Corporate Conduct: The President; Bush Signs Bill Aimed at Fraud In Corporations; in: 
THE NEW YORK TIMES (July 31, 2002). 
19  cf.: Bruce A. Green & Ellen S. Podgor, Unregulated Internal Investigations: Achieving Fairness for Corporate 
Constituents, 54, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW, 73, 83 f. (2013). 
20  In this context Marxist-leaning approaches which attack the market economy as an economic system dominate 
(“greed-is-good mentality”; Predatory Society), cf. e.g PAUL BLUMBERG, THE PREDATORY SOCIETY. DECEP-
TION IN THE AMERICAN MARKETPLACE (1989); further James William Coleman, Toward an Integrated The-
ory of White-Collar Crime, 93, AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, 406 (1987); summary JAMES WILLIAM 
COLEMAN, THE CRIMINAL ELITE: UNDERSTANDING WHITE-COLLAR CRIME, 193-233 (6th ed. 2006). 
21  cf. press release by the SPD party by Johannes Fechner (Member of Parliament), “Korruption im Gesund-
heitswesen beenden.” retrievable at: http://www.spdfraktion.de/presse/pressemitteilungen /korruption-im-
gesundheitswesen-beenden, as well as the website of the Member of Parliament Kathrin Vogler (Die Linke), 
retrievable at: http://www.kathrin-vogler.de/themen/gesundheit/korruption/details/zurueck/aerztekorrup-
tion/artikel/korruption-im-gesundheitswesen-die-krebsmafia/. 
22  e.g. Transparency International.  
23  HOWARD S. BECKER, OUTSIDERS: STUDIES IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANCE, 147 ff. (1966). 
24  Paradigmatic Thomas Fischer, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR MEDIZINSTRAFRECHT 1, 1 f. (2015): “Corruption in the 
healthcare system, in particular in the contract doctor system, must finally be made prosecutable and consist-
ently prosecuted.  Only after several dozen doctors and distributors have actually been sentenced and have 
been deprived of their careers will the message that gang-like corruption to the detriment of the public and its 
weakest members will not be tolerated.” And: “unscrupulous enrichment at the expense of society which sig-
nificantly defines the healthcare market “; see also: Cornelia Gaedigk, Kein Sonderrecht für Ärzte – ein Ein-
wurf aus Sicht der Ermittlungspraxis, 5, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR MEDIZINSTRAFRECHT, 268 (2015). 
25  e.g.: Oliver Pragal, Das Pharma-„Marketing” um die niedergelassenen Kassenärzte: „Beauftragtenbestechung” 
gemäß § 299 StGB!, 5, NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR STRAFRECHT, 133 (2005); THOMAS FISCHER, STRAFGESETZ-
BUCH, § 299 No. 10e StGB (62th ed. 2015). 
26  In Germany hyphenated terminology has established itself in this context: Arzneimittel-Skandal, Or-
ganspendeskandal, Pflegeskandal or the name of the affected company is used, e.g. Ratiopharm-Skandal, cf..: 
DER SPIEGEL ONLINE, Ratiopharm-Skandal: "Das erschüttert den Glauben an den Rechtsstaat", in: 
http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/service/ratiopharm-skandal-das-erschuettert-den-glauben-an-den-
rechtsstaat-a-648892.html. (Ratiopharm Scandal: “Undermining Faith in the Rule of Law”). 
27  Pamela H. Bucy, Coporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability, 75, MINNESOTA 
LAW REVIEW, 1095, 1157 (1991); a differentiated reconstruction of this approach can be found in Alschuler, who 
i.a. presents the view advocated by Beale (follows below), Albert W. Alschuler, Two ways to think about the 
punishment of corporation, 46, AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW, 1359, 1369 (2009): “The entity can be evil 
although the people who comprise it are mostly good. (...) the entity has not only an ethos, but a soul. The 
devils inside it must be exorcised despite the human cost”. 
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facts of a case as a criminal offense which has not yet been solved.28 In this spirit, the judges 
increasingly gravitate towards incarceration of “corporate criminals” and toward imposi-
tion of Draconian company penalties, 29 where the respective legal system provides for 
such an instrument or an equivalent (economic “forfeiture” in German Criminal Business 
Law30).31 
 
B. The Defense Strategy of the Businesses- the Significance of Internal Investi-
gations in Punitive Criminal Business Law 
 
The depicted development naturally did not pass over the businesses without any impact. 
Investigation proceedings against the competitors are perceived as a “ticking time 
bomb”.32  It is expedient to prepare for investigations, to have an effective defense. In 
short: Businesses all over the world have set themselves up in a testudo formation in an 
attempt to effectively defend themselves from the attacker in the shape of a strong state 
and its investigation authorities (similar to the well trained Roman legionnaires when us-
ing the “scutum”). The name of the ever-so ponderous bulwark is Compliance and has at 
least the latent function33 of shielding the business from government encroachment, pre-
venting corporate misconduct from the start or at least making it internally visible and 
retaining the defining authority over cases relevant in Criminal Law. 
 
			
28  cf. the reports in the media on the DRK clinic scandal, cf.: “DRK-Skandal So lief die Abzocke”, (DRK Scandal: 
This Is How the Rip-Off Happened) retrievable at: http://www.berliner-kurier.de/berlin/polizei-und-jus-
tiz/drk-skandal-so-lief-die-abzocke-4543444. 
29  For example, the British pharmaceutical company GSK in China was fined 491 million dollars in China, cf.: 
Thomas Fox, GSK in China: A New Dawn in the International Fight Against Corruption, 1, COMPLIANCE 
ELLIANCE JOURNAL 29, 41 (Vol. 1 No. 1 2015), retrievable at: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:15-
qucosa-176485; the CEO of Worldcom Bernie Ebbers was sentenced to 25 years of incarceration at age 63 on 
grounds of accounting fraud, see http://www.capital.de/themen/der-worldcom-skandal.html (retrieved on 
March 16, 2016).    
30  Hans Theile, Die Herausbildung normativer Orientierungsmuster für Internal Investigations – am Beispiel 
selbstbelastender Aussagen, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR INTERNATIONALE STRAFRECHTSDOGMATIK, 378, 379 (2013) 
referring to qualitative Interviews: “Nowadays there are ‘hitlists’ regarding which prosecuting attorney can 
show the greatest adsorption volume. This is a mindset that was totally irrelevant when I [...] started out with 
legal defense. Looking at it this way [...] prosecuting attorneys have now also become business enterprises”.  
31  In detail Hendrik Schneider, in: Matthias Jahn & Charlotte Schmitt-Leonardy & Christian Schoop (publ.), 
DAS UNTERNEHMENSSTRAFRECHT UND SEINE ALTERNATIVEN, 25 (2016) 
32  cf. Burkhard Boemke et. al, Evidenzbasierte Kriminalprävention im Unternehmen.Wirksamkeit von Compli-
ance-Maßnahmen in der deutschen Wirtschaft – Ein empirisches Forschungsvorhaben, 9, DENKSTRÖME, 
79 (2012); Hendrik Schneider & Kevin Grau & Kristin Kißling, „Der Schock von Berlin saß tief!” Ergebnisse 
eines empirischen Forschungsvorhabens zu Compliance im Gesundheitswesen und der Pharmaindustrie, COR-
PORATE COMPLIANCE ZEITSCHRIFT, 48 (2013).  
33  In detail: KRISTIN KIßLING, DIE LATENTE FUNKTION VON COMPLIANCE. (2016); Michele DeStefano, The 
Chief Compliance Officer - Should there be a new “C” in the C-Suite?, THE PRACTICE (July 2016), retrievable 
at: https://thepractice.law.harvard.edu/article/the-chief-compliance-officer/.  
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One key means of the repressive arm of Compliance 34 are “internal investigations”.35 
These are investigations carried out by the business or by a hired agent in the case of sus-
picion of breaches of the law or other legal violations.36 
 
The function of the internal investigations varies depending on the question of whether 
the facts to be determined are already the subject of government investigation proceed-
ings. In the case of ongoing investigation proceedings, searches (still legal in compliance 
with the rule of reasonableness37) may be prevented by the internal investigations.38 Evi-
dence may be provided to the authorities under supervision. In this way, a certain degree 
of control by the business is retained in the proceedings. Moreover, the (customary) pub-
lic guarantee of extensive internal solution of the case39 is a means of limiting reputation 
damage and diverting the accusation from the delinquent corporate structure to the indi-
vidual criminal employee, i.e. from a failure of the system to an individual transgression. 
Outside of government investigation proceedings, internal investigations provide the op-
portunity of detecting incriminating conduct and subjecting it to the judgment of an en-
trepreneurial decision (to continue or to modify the business activity that has been 
acknowledged or is regarded as relevant in Criminal Law?). It is part of risk screening and 
risk management and prepares internal sanctions against the perpetrators. Internal inves-
tigations provide the freedom to make a decision as to whether and in what way (criminal 
prosecution or “only” an Employment Law measure) to react to a detected violation.40 
Where instated immediately in the case of existing grounds of suspicion, the business is 
prepared if government proceedings should be taken. Moreover, an external or internal 			
34 Folker Bittmann, Internal Investigations Under German Law, COMPLIANCE ELLIANCE JOURNAL, 74, 77 
(Vol. 1 No. 1 2015), retrievable at: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:15-qucosa-176443; Hans Theile, Die 
Herausbildung normativer Orientierungsmuster für Internal Investigations –  am Beispiel selbstbelastender 
Aussagen, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR INTERNATIONALE STRAFRECHTSDOGMATIK, 378, 384 (2013). 
35  The emergence of Internal Investigations was backed differently by academia and practice in Germany and the 
US, in Germany the attitude toward internal investigations tended to be suspicious and unfavorable: clear 
skepticism at Gina Greve, Privatisierung behördlicher Ermittlungen, STRAFVERTEIDIGER FORUM, 89 (2013) 
with further references; in contrast, the attitude in the US was embracive from the start: cf. Lucian E. Dervan, 
International White Collar Crime and the Globalization of internal Investigations, FORDHAM URBAN LAW 
JOURNAL, 361, 364 (2011), with reference to relevant case law.  
36  cf. JOSEPHINE SCHARNBERG, ILLEGALE INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS, 27 (2015); cf. also Sascha Süße & Car-
olin Püschel, Collecting Evidence in Internal Investigations in the Light of Parallel Criminal Proceedings, COM-
PLIANCE ELLIANCE JOURNAL, 26, 29 f. (Vol. 2 No. 1 2016), retrievable at http://nbn-resolv-
ing.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:15-qucosa-199168; showing the initial situation upon instatement of an Internal Inves-
tigation: Bruce A. Green & Ellen S. Podgor, Unregulated Internal Investigations: Achieving Fairness for Cor-
porate Constituents, 54, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW, 73 (2013). 
37 Folker Bittmann, Internal Investigations Under German Law, COMPLIANCE ELLIANCE JOURNAL, 74, 87 
(Vol. 1 No. 1 2015), retrievable at: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:15-qucosa-176443. 
38 Sascha Süße & Carolin Püschel, Collecting Evidence in Internal Investigations in the Light of Parallel Criminal 
Proceedings, COMPLIANCE ELLIANCE JOURNAL, 26, 34 (Vol. 2 No. 1 2016), retrievable at: http://nbn-resolv-
ing.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:15-qucosa-199168. 
39  Klaus Moosmayer, in Interne Untersuchungen, 3 (Klaus Moosmayer & Niels Hartwig 2012).  
40  cf. Sascha Süße & Carolin Püschel, Collecting Evidence in Internal Investigations in the Light of Parallel Crim-
inal Proceedings, COMPLIANCE ELLIANCE JOURNAL, 26, 30 (Vol. 2 No. 1 2016), retrievable at: http://nbn-
resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:15-qucosa-199168. 
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whistleblower is likely to refrain from criminal prosecution if he recognizes that the com-
pany has already adequately responded to the offense reported by him. 
II. THE ROLE OF THE IN-HOUSE COUNSEL - GERMAN AND INTERNA-
TIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
A. Involvement of the in-house counsel in internal investigations 
 
   In-house counsels, who are frequently corporate lawyers, are directly involved in inter-
nal investigations. Klaus Moosmayer, Chief Counsel Compliance of Siemens AG, sum-
marizes it as follows: 
 
“Either a corporate lawyer with the relevant expertise or an external lawyer hired for the 
purpose may participate as a representative of the company in the investigations. It must 
be taken into account here that even where an external law firm is hired for the internal 
investigations the function of coordinator is always required within the company, which 
is normally performed by a lawyer from the internal Legal and/or Compliance depart-
ment. Without this “project office”, investigations performed by external professionals in 
the company will hardly be able to be performed within an acceptable period and at rea-
sonable costs.” 41 
 
Nothing could be truer. The fact that internal investigations have developed into a lucra-
tive market for external providers is not to be underestimated. The problem of the limits 
on internal investigations exists in particular where the company promised to solve the 
case completely, as is often the case. External providers of “forensic services” take ad-
vantage of this and conclude their reports with a statement that further investigation of 
the case is necessary, not only to avoid liability risks. Moreover, the external specialists are 
often not lawyers but former police officers, economists or IT specialists. They need to 
submit the investigations to legal guidance with regard to the applicable Criminal Law 
provisions to the facts of the case. Failing this, there is a risk that the investigations become 
trivial or extend to facts which have already lapsed under the statute of limitations. To 
this extent, in-house counsels fill an important interdisciplinary function. They coordi-
nate the work of external providers of relevant services, evaluate the results, draw legal 
conclusions from them and prevent unnecessary expenses (which may even be the basis 
of embezzlement accusations against the executive body having the investigations per-
formed). 
 
B. Significance of Legal Privilege 
 
1. Consequences for the practice of internal investigations 
 
Against this backdrop it is decisive for the work of the in-house counsels and the external 			
41  Klaus Moosmayer, in Interne Untersuchungen, 3 (Klaus Moosmayer & Niels Hartwig 2012). 
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lawyers involved in the internal investigations whether they can trust that the information 
obtained by them and the documents prepared by them will remain confidential in the 
case of investigation proceedings. Extensive protection would be ensured if the legal priv-
ileges set out in the StPO (Criminal Proceedings Ordinance) (right to refuse to provide 
evidence, § 53 Sect. 1 Clause. 1, No. 3; prohibition of seizure, § 97 Sect. 1-3; surveillance 
prohibition, § 100c Sect. 6 and the restriction of investigation measures in accordance with 
§ 160c StPO) can be claimed.42  For US proceedings, they would have to be covered by the 
Attorney-Client Privilege or respectively the Work Product Doctrine would have to ap-
ply.43 If they can claim these privileges the defense strategy of the testudo takes the desired 
effect. The company has absolute control over the flow of information to the investiga-
tion authorities. The latter cannot gain anything from the internal investigation results 
without the consent of the company and may not resort to them. In the case of refused 
cooperation, prosecuting attorneys and police forces have to start from scratch; the key 
documents may be in the possession of the party subject to professional secrecy. 
 
If in contrast legal privilege is denied, the company loses the protection and the head of 
the internal investigations will find himself in hot water. On the one hand, he owes his 
company or employer secrecy and loyalty, on the other hand, as a witness, he is obligated 
to testify and must do so truthfully and completely; his documents may be seized in the 
process.44 
 
The conception of internal investigations, the question as to who heads them, who is in-
volved and who is not be involved, is thus decisively dependent on the extent of the legal 
privilege. According to the legal situation in Germany a distinction is to be made between 
(external) lawyers /defense counsels, in-house counsels and corporate lawyers. This dis-
tinction is unknown in the Anglo-Saxon legal tradition. Which model is preferable, which 
an atavism in the globalized economy? 
 
2. Substance and legitimation of legal privilege 
 
It can be stated in a somewhat simplified manner that legal privilege has a longer tradition 
than the in-house counsel profession. The corporate lawyer or “Syndikus” has an excep-
tional position in this context. In the Middle Ages this was regarded as a legal scholar in 
charge of the legal affairs of the towns or local authorities.45 It was not until World War I 
that companies switched to having internal corporate lawyers advise and represent them 			
42  cf. see detailed Folker Bittmann, Internal Investigations Under German Law, COMPLIANCE ELLIANCE JOUR-
NAL, 74, 92 ff. (Vol. 1 No. 1 2015), retrievable at: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:15-qucosa-176443. 
43  Basics on Attorney-Client Privilege: Upjohn Co. v. United States 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981); on Work Product 
Doctrine: Hickman v. Taylor 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947). 
44  Rainer Griesbaum, in Karlsruher Kommentar zur Strafprozessordnung, § 161a No. 4 StPO (Rolf Hannich 7th 
ed. 2013); cf. BVerfG: Recht des Zeugen auf einen Rechtsbeistand, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT, 103 
(1975).  
45  The term “Syndicus” is derived from the Greek “sýndikos” (advocate, attorney).  
		 COMPLIANCE  ELLIANCE  JOURNAL   |   VOLUME 3   NUMBER 1   2017 
HENDRIK SCHNEIDER | THE ENTERPRISE IN TESTUDO FORMATION 
 
PAGE  52 
and resorted to external lawyers with less and less frequency.46 Contrary to the in-house 
counsel, the corporate lawyer is simultaneously admitted to the bar, a fact which cast 
doubts on his legal position if he is employed by the company he represents, ever since his 
emergence.47 The same was true of the terminology. Whereas up until 2016 the talk was 
either of Syndizi, Syndikusanwälte or Syndikus-Rechtsanwälte,48 i.e. a uniform terminol-
ogy was lacking, the legislator with the Act on the Reorganization of Corporate Counsel 
Law in 201649  introduced the uniform term “Syndikusrechtsanwalt“ (§ 46 II BRAO) 
(roughly: corporate lawyer).  According to the legal definition in § 46 Sect. 2 BRAO a 
corporate lawyer is an employee who practices as a lawyer (as defined by § 46 Sect. 3 
BRAO) for his employer who is not a lawyer, patent lawyer or legal firm or patent law 
firm. For his work, the corporate lawyer must be admitted to the bar pursuant to § 46a 
BRAO. 
 
In contrast, legal privilege originated in the 16th century in the Anglo-Saxon legal tradi-
tion50 and in Germany as a uniform provision for the right to refuse evidence for the de-
fendant’s legal defense counsel and public lawyers in the “Draft of a German Criminal 
Law Ordinance” of 1874: “ For the attorney-client relationship is always based on trust 
which is entitled to protection of the law and the law may not force the client to conceal 
specific facts because of the fear that their disclosure could lead to criminal prosecution”.51 
The right to refuse evidence for lawyers with regard to information disclosed to them 
during the exercise of their profession was finally set forth in § 52 No. 3 of the Criminal 
Procedural Ordinance of the German Empire (1877).  
 
Recognition of the right to refuse evidence or the Attorney-Client Privilege52 was not to 
be taken for granted. Only gradually did the attitude gain ground that confidentiality of 
communication between attorney and client is not only in the individual interest of the 
parties involved, but also in the interest of administration of justice in general and takes 
precedence over the possibilities of more extensive investigation of the case. In the Anglo-			
46  cf.: Hans-Jürgen Hellwig, Der Syndikusanwalt – neue Denkansätze. Die systematische Ausgrenzung des Syn-
dikusanwalts seit 1934, 1, ANWALTSBLATT, 2 (2015). 
47  Claus Roxin, Das Zeugnisverweigerungsrecht des Syndikusanwalts, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT, 
1130 (1992). 
48  Cf. Gregor Thüsing & Johannes Fütterer, Der Syndikus und die Anwaltszulassung nach dem Referentenent-
wurf des BMJV – Sein oder Nichtsein? NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR ARBEITSRECHT, 595, 596 (2015).  
49  BT-print. 18/5201. 
50  In his study Auburn refers to a dozen cases between 1570 and 1580 through which the Attorney-Client Privilege 
was established, cf. JONATHAN AUBURN, LEGAL PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEGE: LAW AND THEORY, 2000. In 
detail: Goeffrey C. Hazard, An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege, CALIFORNIA LAW RE-
VIEW, 1061, 1070 (1978). 
51  CARL HAHN, DIE GESAMMTEN MATERIALIEN ZU DEN REICHS-JUSITZGESETZEN BD. 3, 106 f. (1880/1881). 
52  According to an established definition the Attorney-Client Privilege comprises the following legal position: 
“(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal advisor in his capacity as such, (3) the 
communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance per-
manently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except the protection be waived.”, 
cf. JOHN H. WIGMORE, WIGMOR ON EVIDENCE § 2292, at 554 (McNaughton, revised ed. 1961). 
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Saxon legal tradition this perspective, which reinforced and established the attorney-client 
privilege can be traced to a paradigm shift in the derivation of the privilege. The reason 
for the legal privilege was no longer the “gentleman approach” which traced the lawyer’s 
right to silence and to refuse evidence to “oath and honor of the attorney”53, but the no-
tion embedded in Utilitarianism that the proceedings must be in accordance with the rule 
of law and the corresponding general interest in a well-functioning practice of the legal 
profession.54 In Germany legal privilege is also an expression of the idea that the lawyer is 
a legal administration body.  In an essential ruling the German Supreme Court ex-
pounds55: 
 
“The protection of the practice of the legal profession against government control and 
patronization is not solely in the individual interest of the specific lawyer of the specific 
client. The lawyer is a 'legal administration body’ whose vocation is to represent the inter-
ests of his client. His professional work is in the public interest in effective legal admin-
istration in accordance with the principles of the rule of law. Under the principle of the 
rule of law set out in the Constitution, already on grounds of equal opportunity and pro-
cedural equality the citizens are entitled to a legal counsel who they can trust and who 
they can expect to represent their interests independently, freely and free of self-interest.  
As the appointed independent advisor and counsel it is incumbent on him to provide 
comprehensive support to his client. 
 
The prerequisite for fulfilling this task is a relationship of trust between the attorney and 
the client. Integrity and reliability of the individual member of the profession as well as 
the right and duty of confidentiality are basic conditions for the development of this trust. 
Hence, professional secrecy has always been one of the lawyer’s fundamental duties.” 
 
3. Extent of legal privilege 
 
It can be concluded from this that the lawyer as well as the defense counsel (§ 138 StPO) 
have a right to refuse evidence as bound to professional secrecy under German Criminal 
Law § 53 Sect. 1 Nr. 2, Nr. 3 StPO. Protection against circumvention is provided by the 
right to refuse evidence by paraprofessionals (§ 53a StPO), the seizure prohibition (§ 97 
StPO) and the prohibitions on the recording and evaluation of evidence set out in § 160a 
StPO (as from Jan. 1, 2008) for investigative acts which concern parties subject to profes-
sional secrecy who have the right to refuse evidence. Naturally, the particulars of these 			
53  JOHN H. WIGMORE, WIGMOR ON EVIDENCE § 2292, at 554 (McNaughton, revised ed. 1961). 54  Hunt v. Blackburn 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1988): the privilege “is founded upon the necessity, in the interest and 
administration of justice, of the aid of persons having knowledge of the law and skilled in its practice, which 
assistance can only be safely and readily availed of when free from the consequences or the apprehension of 
disclosure”; Trammel v. United States 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980): “The lawyer-client privilege rests on the need for 
the advocate and counselor to know all that relates to the client's reasons for seeking representation if the pro-
fessional mission is to be carried out”. 
55  BVerfG: † Geldwäsche durch Strafverteidiger, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT , 1305, 1307 (2004). 
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privileges in internal investigations are contested.56 The prevalent opinion is that under 
German Employment Law associates are obligated to provide information in the case of 
an “interrogation” by private persons even if they incriminate themselves.57 For members 
of the representative and supervisory boards this duty is derived from Company Law.58 
Despite the conflict between the duty to provide information and the procedural right to 
refrain from self-incriminating testimony (interrogation of an employee suspected of an 
offense), legal practice assumes that the information provided by the employee or execu-
tive is at least indirectly of use.59 Such information may in any case be used to instate in-
vestigative proceedings against the party concerned.60  
 
With regard to the right to refuse evidence and seizure prohibition it is important who 
gave the lawyer (or defense counsel) the retainer. If the retainer is from the company the 
company may release him from the duty of professional secrecy with the consequence 
that the documents can be seized and evaluated when the accused associate objects.61  It 
has not yet been determined if documents such as final reports on the internal investiga-
tion are at least not subject to seizure if the investigations are aimed against the company 
(in connection with the order of forfeiture or imposition of a company fine). Moreover, 			
56  Basics: Matthias Jahn, Ermittlungen in Sachen Siemens/SEC, STRAFVERTEIDIGER, 41 (2009); Carsten Mo-
msen, Internal Investigations zwischen arbeitsrechtlicher Mitwirkungspflicht und strafprozessualer Selbstbelas-
tungsfreiheit, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR INTERNATIONALE STRAFRECHTSDOGMATIK, 508 (2001); Christian Pelz, 
Ambiguities in International Internal Investigations, COMPLIANCE ELLIANCE JOURNAL 14 (Vol. 2 No. 1 2016), 
retrievable at: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:15-qucosa-199152; Folker Bittmann, Internal Investiga-
tions Under German Law, COMPLIANCE ELLIANCE JOURNAL, 74 (Vol. 1 No. 1 2015), retrievable at: 
http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:15-qucosa-176443; Sascha Süße & Carolin Püschel, Collecting Evi-
dence in Internal Investigations in the Light of Parallel Criminal Proceedings, COMPLIANCE ELLIANCE JOUR-
NAL, 26 (Vol. 2 No. 1 2016), retrievable at: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:15-qucosa-199168. 
57  Hans Theile, Die Herausbildung normativer Orientierungsmuster für Internal Investigations –  am Beispiel 
selbstbelastender Aussagen, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR INTERNATIONALE STRAFRECHTSDOGMATIK, 378, 378 (2013); 
Martin Lützeler & Patrick Müller-Sartori, Die Befragung des Arbeitnehmers – Auskunftspflicht oder Zeugnis-
verweigerungsrecht? CORPORATE COMPLIANCE ZEITSCHRIFT, 19 (2011); cf. also: Burkhard Göpfert & Frank 
Merten & Carolin Siegrist, Mitarbeiter als „Wissensträger”. Ein Beitrag zur aktuellen Compliance-Diskussion, 
NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT, 1703, 1705 (2008).  
58  cf. Folker Bittmann, Internal Investigations Under German Law, COMPLIANCE ELLIANCE JOURNAL, 74, 97 
(Vol. 1 No. 1 2015), retrievable at: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:15-qucosa-176443. 
59  Important detail questions discussed in the literature have not yet been the subject matter of court rulings such 
as the question of usability of statements obtained using prohibited interrogation methods within the scope 
of internal investigations, see Matthias Jahn, Ermittlungen in Sachen Siemens/SEC, STRAFVERTEIDIGER, 41 
(2009).  
60  For example the Municipal Court of Hamburg: “ The idea that the authority of the state may not force the 
subjects of the law to self-incrimination through duties of cooperation and information subject to punishment 
upon breach and to use the disclosed information to prosecute him is clearly not applicable to the present case 
in which private persons have entered legal (employment) relationships which may force them to disclose crim-
inal behavior”, Margarete Gräfin v. Galen, LG Hamburg: Beschlagnahme von Interviewprotokollen nach „In-
ternal Investigations” – HSH Nordbank, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT, 942, 944 (2011); in contrast 
Hans Theile, Internal Investigations« und Selbstbelastung, STRAFVERTEIDIGER, 381, 384 ff. (2011);  also Luís 
Greco & Christian Caracas, Internal investigations und Selbstbelastungsfreiheit, NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
STRAFRECHT, 7, 8 ff. (2015). 
61  cf. Folker Bittmann, Internal Investigations Under German Law, COMPLIANCE ELLIANCE JOURNAL, 74, 97 
(Vol. 1 No. 1 2015), retrievable at: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:15-qucosa-176443. 
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it is unclear when the protection starts to take effect, i.e. when a protected defense rela-
tionship starts. 62 Hence, in conclusion it must be stated that already in the group of law-
yers and defense counsels who have a right to refuse evidence, protection of the procured 
facts against the encroachment of the investigation authorities is only patchy. The testudo 
strategy only works partially: German Criminal Procedural Law only equips the legion-
naires with the round shield (parma), not with the rectangular shield (scutum). 
 
Protection through the said procedural privileges fails entirely where the parties in ques-
tion are not subject to professional secrecy, but belong to the company (Compliance Of-
ficer, associates/Head of Internal Auditing, Corporate Lawyer or an employee of a com-
pany specialized in conducting internal investigations (forensic services). According to the 
legal situation since Jan. 1, 2016 (Act on the Reorganization of Corporate Lawyers Law63) 
this has now also been settled for corporate lawyers. Pursuant to § 53 Sect. 1 Nr. 3 StPO 
they are explicitly exempt from the right to refuse evidence and the procedural guarantees 
securing this.64 The ratio decidendi for this restriction are Criminal Law policy motives. 
“The ratio decidendi for the restriction of legal privileges is the need for effective criminal 
prosecution. Inclusion of the corporate lawyers and corporate patent lawyers under the 
scope of application of §§ 97 and 160a StPO would harbor the risk that relevant evidence 
would not be available to the investigation authorities.”  The legislator is following the 
precedent set by the European Supreme Court in the well-known Akzo/Nobel case.65  
Here, denial of protection of the confidentiality of communication was rejected with the 
argument that due to his economic dependence on the employer the corporate lawyer 
does not have the same freedom as the external lawyer. The consequences of the exclusion 
of corporate lawyers from legal privileges in practice are radical: An associate who discloses 
information to a corporate lawyer (often the corporate lawyer and Head of Compliance 
are the same person) cannot rely on confidentiality. The corporate lawyer may be inter-
rogated as a witness, his documents are subject to seizure.  
The case is entirely different in the US. There it has been initially acknowledged as the 			
62  According to the Municipal Court of Gießen, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTS- UND STEUESTRAFRECHT, 
409, 409 f. (2012), the seizure prohibition set out in § 97 Sect. 1 Nr. 1 StPO “also applies to defense documents 
prepared for the formal instatement of investigation proceedings”, for more details see: Stefan Rütters & Anne 
Schneider, Die Beschlagnahme anwaltlicher Unterlagen im Unternehmensgewahrsam, GOLTDAMMER'S AR-
CHIV FÜR STRAFRECHT, 160 (2014). 
63  BT Drucks. 18/5201 
64  Regarding the legal situation prior to Jan. 1, 2016, cf. Winfried Hassemer, Das Zeugnisverweigerungsrecht des 
Syndikusanwalts, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTS- UND STEUERSTRAFRECHT, 1 (1986), Claus Roxin, Das 
Zeugnisverweigerungsrecht des Syndikusanwalts, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT, 1129 (1992), Claus Ro-
xin, Das Beschlagnahmeprivileg des Syndikusanwalts im Lichte der neuesten Rechtsentwicklung, NEUE JURIS-
TISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT, 17 (1995) and Konrad Redeker, Der Syndikusanwalt als Rechtsanwalt, NEUE JU-
RISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT, 889 (2004). 
65  EuGH, (European Supreme Court) ruling of Sept. 14, 2010, C-550/07. P. Hustus,  rightly points out that this 
ruling only concerned the European anti-trust proceedings and was not necessarily capable of being extrapo-
lated to the StPO, Ludmila Hustus, Der Syndikusanwalt und das Legal Privilege respektive das Anwaltsprivi-
leg – alea iacta est, NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR STRAFRECHT, 65 (2016); detailed reconstruction of the ruling and 
the underlying facts of the case in: Lucian E. Dervan, International White Collar Crime and the Globalization 
of internal Investigations, FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL, 361, 369 ff. (2011). 
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flipside of Corporate Criminal Law since the Upjohn ruling by the Supreme Court in 
198166 that legal privilege does not only apply to natural, but also to legal entities: 
 
“Admittedly complications in the application of the privilege arise when the client is a 
corporation, which, in theory, is an artificial creature of the law, and not an individual; 
but this Court has assumed that the privilege applies when the client is a corporation.”67 
From this point on, it is now a foregone conclusion that attorney-client privilege applies 
to the corporation,“68 
 
and that there is no difference between an in-house counsel and external lawyer or defense 
counsel69.  The arguments that the corporate lawyer70 is economically dependent and 
subject to the duty to follow his employer’s instructions have been deemed untenable for 
justifying a distinction between the two professional groups: “[t]hese are not sufficient 
differences to distinguish the two types of counsel for purposes of the attorney-client priv-
ilege.” 71 Therefore, attorney-client privilege technically applies equally to in-house and 
external counsel, as the “lawyer’s status as in-house counsel ‘does not dilute the privilege.” 
72 
 
Within the context of the emergence of internal investigations it was then contested how-
ever, who the attorney’s client is and accordingly who can decide on the exercise and grant 
of the privilege. According to the “Control Group Test” the status of the associate dis-
closing information to the internal or external lawyer is decisive. 73According to this, the 
privilege applies to the extent that the associate can implement legal counsel provided on 			
66  In detail: John E. Sexton, A Post-UPJOHN consideration of the corporate attorney-client privilege, NEW YORK 
UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, 443 (1982); cf. also Gerald F. Luttkus, Implications of Upjohn Symposium: The 
Role of Professionals in Corporate Governance: Note, 57, NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW, 887 (1981); Lucian E. 
Dervan, Internal Investigations and the Evolving Fate of Privilege, COMPLIANCE ELLIANCE JOURNAL, 3, 5 
(Vol. 2 No. 1 2016), retrievable at: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:15-qucosa-199145. 
67		 Upjohn Co. v. United States 449 U.S. 389-390 (1981).	
68  CFTC v. Weintraub 471 U.S. 343, 348 (1985): “It is by now well established, and undisputed by the parties to 
this case, that the attorney-client privilege attaches to corporations as well as to individuals.” 
69  Grace G. Giesel, Upjohn Warnings, the Attorney-Client Privilege, and Principles of Lawyer Ethics: Achieving 
Harmony, UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW, 109, 140 (2010), the article refers to rulings by district courts 
in which even non-lawyers are subject to the protection of privilege; for the distinction between Inhouse Coun-
sel and external lawyer or defense council with the example of the Bank of China case see also Lucian E. Dervan, 
Internal Investigations and the Evolving Fate of Privilege, COMPLIANCE ELLIANCE JOURNAL, 3, 10 (Vol. 2 No. 
1 2016), retrievable at: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:15-qucosa-199145. 
70  United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp. 89 F.Supp 357, 358-359 (D. Mass.1950). 
71  United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp. 89 F.Supp 357, 358-359 (D. Mass.1950). 
72  In re Kellogg Brown and Root, 756 F.3d; cf. also Lucian E. Dervan, Internal Investigations and the Evolving 
Fate of Privilege, COMPLIANCE ELLIANCE JOURNAL, 3, 6 (Vol. 2 No. 1 2016), retrievable at: http://nbn-resolv-
ing.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:15-qucosa-199145; Michele DeStefano describes the difference between the in-house 
counsel and the compliance professional: Michele DeStefano, The Chief Compliance Officer - Should there be 
a new “C” in the C-Suite?, THE PRACTICE (July 2016), retrievable at: https://thepractice.law.harvard.edu/ar-
ticle/the-chief-compliance-officer/. 
73  City of Philadelphia vs. Westinghouse Electric. Crop, 210 F. Supp. 483, 485 (E.D. Pa. 1962) 
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the basis of his representation of the facts of the case as a business decision. From a differ-
ent standpoint, the subject matter of the associate’s statement is decisive (“Subject Matter 
Test” 74). Where communication takes places at the instruction of a body of the company 
looking for legal counsel for the company and the associate’s statement refers to his duties 
under Employment Law, the privilege applies. 
 
The difference between the two approaches lies primarily in the question of the involve-
ment of associates from lower hierarchy levels in the privilege’s scope of protection. The 
lowest common denominator can be found in the distinction between business and legal 
advice. Privilege only exists where legal counsel, but not merely business advice is being 
sought75.  In more recent case law on the issue of the distinction between business and 
legal advice the “but for” is partially relied on76.  According to this it must be proven that 
the communication has the purpose of obtaining legal counsel: “the communication 
would not have been made ‘but for’ the fact that legal advice was sought.”77 Only in this 
case does the privilege apply. According to the other standpoint it is merely necessary that 
legal advice be obtained, among other things. 78 A final ruling by the Supreme Court on 
this issue is still pending. 
 
In the Upjohn ruling by the Supreme Court the Control Group approach is abandoned 
as a distinction criterion for the extent of protection of the privilege. The status of the 
employee is not decisive, as valuable information may be provided by associates at all hi-
erarchy levels who are thus worthy of protection. Where protection of confidentiality is 
denied there is a risk that interrogation of employees outside of the Control Group will 
be refrained from on procedural grounds in the investigation. This is incompatible with 
the nature and purpose of the attorney-client privilege and its fundamental significance 
for legal proceedings based on the principles of the rule of law. 79  The Supreme Court 
			
74  Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487, 491-492 (7th Cir. 1970), confirmed by 400 U.S. 348 
(1971). 
75  Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 605 (8th Cir. 1978). The distinction between Business 
and Legal Advice needs a thorough examination. In particular in the case of corporate lawyers it is not clear 
that legal advice is being sought: Grace M. Giesel, The Legal Advice Requirement of the Attorney-Client Priv-
ilege: A Special Problem for In-House Counsel and Outside Attorneys representing Corporations, MERCER 
LAW REVIEW, 1169 (1997); Michele DeStefano, The Chief Compliance Officer - Should there be a new “C” in 
the C-Suite?, THE PRACTICE (July 2016), retrievable at: https://thepractice.law.harvard.edu/article/the-chief-
compliance-officer/.  
76  In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 756 F.3d 754 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
77  United. States ex rel. Barko v. Halliburton Co. No. 05-cv-1276, 2014. WL 1016784 (D.D.C. Mar. 6, 2014). 
78  In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 756 F.3d 754 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
79  The significance of the privilege is highlighted as follows: “The attorney–client privilege is the oldest of the 
privileges for confidential communications known to the common law. Its purpose is to encourage full and 
frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the 
observance of law and administration of justice. The privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy 
serves public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer’s being fully informed by the 
client.” cf. Upjohn Co. v. United States 449 U.S. 389 (1981). 
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then makes it clear that in the case where internal investigations are ordered for the pur-
pose of providing legal counsel, the sole client is the company. According to this, only the 
company bodies can release parties from the duty of confidentiality. According to the Su-
preme Court this can lead to misunderstandings in the interrogation of the associates. 
Accordingly, a caveat is necessary following the ruling by the Supreme Court (Upjohn 
warning) comprising the following elements and the disregard of which can entail an ev-
idence evaluation prohibition: 80 
 
“the attorney represents the corporation and not the individual employee; the interview 
is covered by the attorney-client privilege, which belongs to and is controlled by the cor-
poration, not the individual employee; the corporation may decide, in its sole discretion, 
whether to waive the privilege and disclose information from the interview to third par-
ties, including the government.” 81 
 
Thus the two jurisdictions, Germany and the US arrive at different results when deter-
mining the extent of legal privilege. In the US there is extensive protection of communi-
cation within the scope of the internal investigation without taking into consideration 
whether the investigation is being performed by a corporate lawyer or an external lawyer. 
This consolidates the position of the company. As the master over the privilege the com-
pany can decide whether and to what extent it releases its legal counsel from the duty of 
secrecy and discloses information on corporate misconduct. The US works with the car-
rot, Germany with the stick. If the company cooperates with the investigation authorities 
in the US and discloses all information obtained without reservations, the sentence will 
be lighter in accordance with the sentencing guidelines82. In Germany it is unclear if co-
operation is rewarded as the efforts in the Compliance sector do not necessarily extend to 
company fines or the forfeiture order83. Where there is no cooperation and open commu-
nication with the prosecuting attorney the investigation authorities will use coercive 			
80  U.S. v. Nicholas 606 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1112 (C.D. Cal.); lifted on other grounds: United States v. Ruehle 583 
F.3d 600 (9th Cir. 2009); but cf.: In Re Grand Jury Subpoena: Under Seal, 415 F.3d 333 (4th Cir. 2005). 
81  Lucian E. Dervan, International White Collar Crime and the Globalization of internal Investigations, FORD-
HAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL, 361, 379 f. (2011). 
82  A points system is used for determining the severity of the sentence which is reduced by 2 to 5 points depending 
on the extent of the company’s cooperation. Chapter 8 Section   (g) “Self-Reporting, Cooperation and Ac-
ceptance of Responsibility” of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines states: “(1) If the organization (A) prior to an 
imminent threat of disclosure or government investigation; and (B) within a reasonably prompt time after 
becoming aware of the offense, reported the offense to appropriate governmental authorities, fully cooperated 
in the investigation, and clearly demonstrated recognition and affirmative acceptance of responsibility for its 
criminal conduct, subtract 5 points; or (2) If the organization fully cooperated in the investigation and clearly 
demonstrated recognition and affirmative acceptance of responsibility for its criminal conduct, subtract 2 
points; ...” [bold type by the author], retrievable at: http://www.ussc.gov/guidelines-manual/2011/2011-8c25. 
83  Convenient overview at: Imme Roxin, Probleme und Strategien der Compliance-Begleitung in Unternehmen, 
STRAFVERTEIDIGER, 116, 117 f. (2012); regarding cooperation cf. Sascha Süße & Carolin Püschel, Collecting 
Evidence in Internal Investigations in the Light of Parallel Criminal Proceedings, COMPLIANCE ELLIANCE 
JOURNAL, 26, 52 f. (Vol. 2 No. 1 2016), retrievable at: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:15-qucosa-
199168. 
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measures in the investigation proceedings and procure the necessary information.  As ex-
pounded above, this is justified primarily with a Criminal Law policy argument. No 
strong defense positions and privileges may be conceded to the strong company, or else 
the investigation will come to naught. 
 
C. Expedient Corrections 
 
According to the stance taken here the legislative ruling to exclude corporate lawyers from 
legal privilege if they work as a lawyer for the company is inconsistent and dubious from 
the aspect of Criminal Law policy. 84  It therefore behooves correction de lege lata through 
a teleological reduction of § 53 Sect. 1 Nr. 3 StPO. De lege ferenda  cancellation of the 
restriction set out in § 53 Sect. 1 Nr. 3 StPO  and thus a partial equalization of the legal 
situation in German with that in the US is advisable. In contrast, the ruling by the Ger-
man legislator to exclude other company lawyers from legal privilege is accurate. How-
ever, the extent of privilege to legal professionals not admitted to the bar in accordance 
with the legal situation in the US is alien to the system, at least according to the legal un-
derstanding here.   
 
§ 53 StPO and the privileges of the defense counsel and lawyers securing it have the pri-
mary purpose of protecting the relationship of trust between the person of trust and the 
party obtaining legal advice. As already expounded, the attorney/defense counsel privi-
lege also protects the public interest in criminal justice administration based on the rule 
of law and procedural equality and intends to ensure that parties seeking counsel are not 
hindered from providing complete information to the person of trust because they fear 
that he has to disclose the entrusted information. 85   Moreover, the party subject to pro-
fessional secrecy is also to be protected from the coercive situation of keeping confidenti-
ality with regard to the client in conflict with cooperation in the investigation86. 
 
The reorganization of the law concerning corporate lawyers recognizes that the corporate 
lawyer provides legal counsel to his employer and rightly identifies this as the work of a 
lawyer. Accordingly, the legislator declares the aspect of the lack of economic independ-
ence of the corporate lawyer, formerly decisive for denial of legal privilege, as irrelevant 			
84  Regarding the extension of legal privilege to the corporate lawyers, cf. already Christian Burholt, Ein Schritt 
vor, zwei zurück – Gilt das Anwaltsprivileg im europäischen kartellrecht auch für Syndikusanwälte?, 3, BUN-
DESRECHTSANWALTSKAMMER-MITTEILUNG, 100, 102 (2004). 
85  Spaulding stresses this using a metaphor from the healthcare sector: “the patient cannot hope to receive ade-
quate treatment without revealing her symptoms, she is obliged to be full and frank in order to receive effective 
service“, Norman W. Spaulding, Compliance, Creative Deviance, and Resistance to Law: A Theory of the At-
torney-Client Privilege, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION JOURNAL OF THE PROFESSIONAL LAWYER, 135, 159 
(2013). 
86  Lothar Senge, in Karlsruher Kommentar zur Strafprozessordnung, § 53 StPO No. 1 (: Rolf Hannich 7th ed. 
2013); GERD PFEIFFER, STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG, § 53 StPO, No. 1 (5th ed. 2005); ROBERT MAGNUS, DAS 
ANWALTSPRIVILEG UND SEIN ZIVILPROZESSUALER SCHUTZ, 22 ff., 30 ff. (2010); Ludmila Hustus, Der Syn-
dikusanwalt und das Legal Privilege respektive das Anwaltsprivileg – alea iacta est, NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
STRAFRECHT, 65, 70f. (2016). 
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and applies the distinction between business and legal advice customary in Anglo-Saxon 
legal systems, as can be concluded from the legal definition of the functions of a lawyer. 
Because (with the exception of § 46 Sect. 3 Nr. 3, 4 BRAO) only “the examination of legal 
issues including solving of the case as well as elaborating and evaluating potential solu-
tions and providing legal advice” is counted among the professionally independent and 
autonomous functions which are a constituent element of the work of a lawyer and thus 
not provision of exclusively economic advice to the company.  It would be logical to allow 
the right to refuse evidence according to §53 StPO including the privileges secured by it 
for provision of legal advice on Criminal Law, which likewise can fall under the definition 
of lawyer’s work in the same way as for external lawyers87.  Because the initial situation is 
identical in this regard: The corporate lawyer providing legal counsel commands trust, is 
dependent on complete communication of the facts of the case in order to provide legal 
advice and requires protection himself from the conflict of interests depicted above. US 
Criminal Law, normally regarded as being “on top of it”, recognizes this whereas the Ger-
man legislator apparently does not.  
 
If the similar initial situation of external lawyers and of corporate lawyers as presented is 
to be accounted for, there are two different solution approaches. It is at first expedient to 
interpret the restriction in the scope of application of the right to refuse evidence as a 
procedural securing of the prohibited action in § 46c Sect. 2 BRAO. According to this 
corporate lawyers “in penalty or fine proceedings against the employer or his associates” 
“may not act as their defense or representative, this applies where the subject matter of 
the penalty or fine proceedings is a company-related offense accusation, also with regard 
to work as a lawyer as defined by § 4.” Accordingly, § 53 Sect. 1 Nr. 3 StPO can be inter-
preted to the effect that the restriction of the right to refuse evidence only applies where 
the corporate lawyer acts in breach of § 46c BRAO but not when he merely provides legal 
advice internally to the employer with regard to facts relevant to a case in Criminal Law 
which he is solving.  
 
The other possibility of securing the relationship of trust consists in recourse to § 53a 
StPO. If the term paraprofessional is interpreted broadly, which cannot be excluded from 
the wording of § 53a StPO, 88 the corporate lawyer can also be included under this provi-
sion which in accordance with § 53 Sect. 1 Nr. 3 StPO does not explicitly remain unaf-
fected. 89   In this way the important coordinating work of the corporate lawyer in the case 
of management of the internal investigations by an external party subject to professional 			
87  Also agreed on by Winfried Hassemer, Das Zeugnisverweigerungsrecht des Syndikusanwalts, ZEITSCHRIFT 
FÜR WIRTSCHAFTS- UND STEUERSTRAFRECHT, 1 (1986); Claus Roxin, Das Zeugnisverweigerungsrecht des 
Syndikusanwalts, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT, 1129 (1992); Konrad Redeker, Der Syndikusanwalt 
als Rechtsanwalt, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT, 889 (2004) on the legal situation prior to the Act on 
the Reorganization of the Law on Corporate Lawyers 2016. 
88  Lothar Senge, in Karlsruher Kommentar zur Strafprozessordnung, §53a StPO No. 2 (Rolf Hannich 5th ed. 
2013); GERD PFEIFFER, STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG, §53a StPO No. 1 (5th ed. 2005); TIDO PARK, DURCHSU-
CHUNG UND BESCHLAGNAHME, No. 547 (3rd ed. 2015). 
89  BT-Drs. 18/5201, 40. 
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secrecy would be protected, reinforcing the testudo formation in this empirically relevant 
area. There is no reason today for the general weakening of his position in relation to the 
external lawyer on grounds of economic policy.  The recourse to corporate lawyers may 
have made sense in the First World War era by sustainably keeping freelance lawyers away 
from corporate clients90 – but nowadays this context is certainly not verifiable. 
 
The restriction set out in § 53 Sect. 1 Nr. 3 StPO advocated here to correct the depicted 
inconsistency is also not pertinent from the aspect of Criminal Law policy. Forced disclo-
sure of information and the confiscation of documents will entail tactical circumventive 
maneuvers which make it more difficult instead of easier to ascertain the facts of the case. 
Informed companies will resort to external counsel from the start or take other measures 
to foil access to the relevant documents. This undermines the cooperative approach which 
the investigation authorities depend on not least due to their limited resources and limits 
prevention because the corporate lawyer, who may act as the “legal conscience” 91 of a 
company is excluded on procedural grounds in the case of suspicion and consequently 
cannot draw any conclusions for improvement of the Compliance Management system 
from the case. For this reason, in awareness of the legal situation in Germany it is even 
advised in the US to reduce the number of personnel in the Legal Department of the 
company and to rely exclusively on consulting by external lawyers. 92 
 
However, the present plea for assumption of the American Way93 does not extend to in-
cluding the company lawyer who is not admitted to the bar or is admitted as a corporate 
lawyer according to the new legislation (§ 46a BRAO) under the protection of § 53 StPO. 
De lege lata there is no dogmatic leeway. Even de lege ferenda the differences between the 
corporate lawyer not admitted to the bar and the corporate lawyer admitted to the bar are 
factors in favor of the current procedural distinction. The corporate lawyer not admitted 
to the bar may also provide legal advice. But it depends on the individual case to what 
extent he provides the advice independently. Professional independence is the key to trust 
in legal advice that is worthy of protection and thus a constituent element for application 
of legal privilege. 			
90  Claus Roxin, Das Zeugnisverweigerungsrecht des Syndikusanwalts, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT, 
1129, 1131 (1992). 
91  cf. the well-known case of the Compliance Officer ruling by the German Supreme Court (BGHSt 54, 44 ff.), 
in detail: Hendrik Schneider & Peter Gottschaldt, Offene Grundsatzfragen der strafrechtlichen Verantwort-
lichkeit von Compliance-Beauftragten in Unternehmen, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR INTERNATIONALE STRAF-
RECHTSDOGMATIK, 573 (2011). 
92  Andrew R. Nash, In-House but out in the Cold: A Comparison of the Attorney-Client Privilege in the United 
States and European Union, ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL, 453, 492 (2012); with reference to the Akzo Nobel 
ruling by the: “For corporations operating on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean, there appears little value in 
maintaining large in-house legal departments in any European offices”. 
93  The extent of legal privilege in US law is naturally not uncontested, cf. the summary of the arguments “against 
confidentiality” on the basis of an economic analysis of the law (without reference to internal investigations) 
in Dru Stevenson, Against Confidentiality, UC DAVIS LAW REVIEW, 337, 403 (2014): “The rules undermine 
the other ethical rules that call for candor, integrity, and fairness; they undermine public confidence in the legal 
system; and they undermine transparency trust in general through lemons effects”. 
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D. Conclusion 
 
The imponderables of current Criminal Business Law create a demand for legal advice 
which should be subject to clear procedural rules and competences. Analysis of the legal 
framework conditions for internal investigations has proven that currently this is not the 
case. The legal situation in Germany is already not transparent, partly inconsistent and 
diversified. This is especially true of national procedures and the corresponding Cross-
Border Internal Investigations in which even lawyers’ professional duty of secrecy can 
conflict with the duty to disclose information under Criminal Law.94 Criminal Business 
Law already acts as an obstacle to growth95 nowadays, as economic decisions first need to 
be secured through Compliance and Legal, a cumbersome process. The flipside of this 
development is at least the securing of trust in the lawyers providing advice, internal as 
well as external. Companies need a safe harbor to navigate these waters. The present ap-
proach which stabilizes the tactics of the testudo at least in one detailed area and represents 
a certain counterweight to the encroaching risk of companies from unpredictable Crimi-
nal Business Law serves this purpose. 
			
94  Concise presentation of the most important legal issues in Christian Pelz, Ambiguities in International Inter-
nal Investigations, COMPLIANCE ELLIANCE JOURNAL, 14 (Vol. 2 No. 1 2016). 
95  Hendrik Schneider, Wachstumsbremse Wirtschaftsstrafrecht, 1, NEUE KRIMINALPOLITIK, 30 (2012). 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
   Much discussion related to whistleblower programs focus on the importance of pro-
tecting the identity and interests of the whistleblower, as he is emblematically the hero 
who jeopardizes himself personally and professionally to report tax noncompliance. 
However, little discussion contemplates the privacy interests of the reported taxpayer 
who is the subject of the whistleblower claim and potentially resulting investigation. 
The taxpayer, whom the whistleblower reports, may or may not be actually noncompli-
ant. Yet, the reported taxpayer’s name, address, tax returns, and return information may 
become exposed—not only to the whistleblower—but also to the public, due to inade-
quate legislative safeguards. In 2014, the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) adopted the 
Taxpayer Bill of Rights to inform taxpayers of their fundamental rights when dealing 
with the IRS. The Right to Privacy and the Right to Confidentiality are two of these ten 
rights, which are the same rights Congress codified in the Internal Revenue Code 
(“IRC”) in 2015.1 With the push for compliance, these rights are at risk. 
 
This topic becomes increasingly relevant in 2017, as Australia and the European Union 
have recently announced intentions to institute comprehensive whistleblower protec-
tion programs. While their proposed programs will be more expansive in scope than the 
United States IRS program in that they will cover corporate and other types of whistle-
blowing in addition to tax, this paper will focus on tax whistleblowing specifically. Oth-
er governments should scrutinize the United States IRS Whistleblower Program when 
instituting their own programs, so that they may learn from its shortcomings and insti-
tute legislative safeguards from the onset. Increased compliance should not come at the 
cost of taxpayer privacy. 
II. THE UNITED STATES IRS WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM 
 
A. Background 
 
When Congress added IRC §7623(b) in 2006, the United States IRS Whistleblower 
Program (“Whistleblower Program”) expanded into a fully-fledged program by taking 
three measures: 1) instituting its own office, the Whistleblower Office, 2) paying manda-
tory awards to certain whistleblowers, instead of only discretionary rewards, and 3) al-
lowing whistleblowers unsatisfied with their reward determinations to appeal to the Tax 
Court. Where previously the IRS had the discretion to decide whether to issue awards, 
now, in general, whistleblower claims that are determined to “substantially contribute” 			
1  IRS, Taxpayer Bill of Rights: #8, The Right to Confidentiality, Fact Sheet FS-2016-17, March 2016, see: 
https://www.irs.gov/taxpayer-bill-of-rights/taxpayer-bill-of-rights-the-right-to-confidentiality; IRS, Taxpay-
er Bill of Rights: #7, The Right to Privacy, Fact Sheet FS-2016-15, March 2016, see: 
https://www.irs.gov/uac/newsroom/fact-sheets-2016. 
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to the IRS secretary’s decision to proceed on administrative or judicial action must re-
ceive an award if the statutory threshold amounts are met and if it resulted in collection 
of tax, penalties, or other amounts.2 Where the maximum reward was previously a max-
imum of 15% of the collected proceeds and the reward could not exceed $10 million, now 
whistleblowers can receive a higher reward ranging between 15% and 30% of the collect-
ed proceeds resulting from the action and at an unlimited dollar amount.3 With the 
higher potential for payouts, the program offers greater financial incentives, explaining 
the rise in whistleblower claims. “Indeed, since 2007, information submitted by whis-
tleblowers has assisted the IRS in collecting $3.4 billion in revenue, and, in turn, the IRS 
has approved more than $465 million in monetary awards to whistleblowers,” said the 
Director of the IRS Whistleblower Office in the 2016 IRS Whistleblower Program re-
port.4 
 
B. Problem 
 
As the IRS Whistleblower Program incentivizes more whistleblowers to file claims, 
taxpayer information becomes continually more exposed. A whistleblower is often con-
ceptualized as the conscientious employee that reports the tax fraud of his corporate 
employer. However, anyone can blow the whistle on anyone: a nosey neighbor, or a 
revengeful lover—with or without good faith. 
 
The taxpayer’s information—which may range from name, address, or Social Security 
Numbers on a tax return, to whether the taxpayer owes taxes and in what amount—
may become exposed at multiple points.5 Although there is a general rule against disclo-
sure under IRC §6103, as part of an investigation, the IRS officer might disclose infor-
mation to a whistleblower, whether illegitimately or through one of the permissible 
exceptions to the general rule against disclosure.6 The whistleblower might then inten-
tionally or inadvertently disclose that information to a third party, or to the public. If 
the whistleblower does not receive an award when he contends he deserves one, or is 
unsatisfied with the amount of his award, he may bring a claim to the Tax Court for 
review of the IRS decision, at which point, the whistleblower might again disclose sensi-			
2  IRC 7623(b). 
3  IRC §7623(b)(1); Internal Revenue Manual (IRM) 1.2.13.1.12, Policy Statement 4-27, August 13, 2004, see: 
https://www.irs.gov/irm/part1/irm_01-002-013.html. 
4  Internal Revenue Service, IRS Whistleblower Program: Fiscal Year 2016, Annual Report to the Congress at 3, 
see: https://www.irs.gov/pub/whistleblower/fy16_wo_annual_report_final.pdf. 
5  IRC §6103(b)(2)(A) defines “return information” broadly to include the taxpayer’s identity, source of his 
income, whether there is outstanding liability, whether the return is subject to investigation, etc. 
6  Whistleblower Program Does Not Meet Whistleblower’s Need for Information During Lengthy Processing 
Times and Does Not Sufficiently Protect Taxpayer’s Confidential Information from Re-Disclosure by Whis-
tleblowers, National Taxpayer Advocate, Internal Revenue Service, 2015 Annual Report to Congress, Vol. 1, 
The Most Serious Problems Encountered By Taxpayers, #13, at 152–53 (2016) [hereinafter Most Serious Prob-
lems #13] (explaining the general non-disclosure rule has exceptions under IRC §§ 6103(n) and 6103(k)(6), 
which though not specifically addressing disclosures to whistleblowers, could apply in such a context), see: 
http://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/2015ARC/ARC15_Volume1.pdf. 
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tive information. The Tax Court records are public, meaning the taxpayer’s information 
would be published, even if the Court determined he owed nothing in taxes.7 The tax-
payer would not be party to the case, so he may never become aware his name has been 
sullied.8 Even if he does become aware, he cannot practically seek redress given he is not 
a party to the case. 
 
Thus, as will be discussed below, the taxpayer confidentiality and privacy rights become 
increasingly compromised due to a lack of four protections: 
 
• sanctions if the whistleblower reveals information to third parties 
through an unauthorized disclosure; 
• safeguards to protect the information in the first place; 
• remedies to compensate the taxpayer for his loss of privacy; and 
• procedural rules in the Tax Court’s judicial proceedings. 
 
C. Lack of Sanctions 
 
Whistleblowers who disclose a reported taxpayer’s information to the public or to third 
parties should be subject to sanctions to deter future unauthorized disclosures. Under 
IRC §6103’s general rule against disclosure, IRS employees are subject to a general pro-
hibition against disclosing a taxpayer’s returns or return information.9 They cannot, for 
example disclose to a whistleblower that the claim he submitted led to an audit.10 If the 
IRS employee violates this provision, the employee is subject to sanctions under IRC 
§§7431, 7213, and 7213A.11 Problematically, the whistleblower is not subject to these sanc-
tions.12 
 
To bypass the general rule against disclosure, IRS officers disclose information to whis-			
7 Lampert v. United States, 854 F.2d 335, 337 (9th Cir. 1988) (listing cases in which district courts found that 
once tax return information is disclosed in court, “such information is no longer confidential, the taxpayer 
loses any privacy interests in that information, and there is no violation of section 6103 for subsequent disclo-
sures”). 
8  Whistleblower Program Does Not Meet Whistleblower’s Need for Information During Lengthy Processing 
Times and Does Not Sufficiently Protect Taxpayer’s Confidential Information from Re-Disclosure by Whis-
tleblowers, National Taxpayer Advocate, Internal Revenue Service, 2015 Annual Report to Congress, Vol. 1, 
The Most Serious Problems Encountered By Taxpayers, #13, supra note 6, at 156, see: 
http://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/2015ARC/ARC15_Volume1.pdf.  
9  IRC §6103(a). 
10  Internal Revenue Service, Confidentiality and Disclosure for Whistleblowers (March 21, 2017), see: 
https://www.irs.gov/uac/confidentiality-and-disclosure-for-whistleblowers. 
11  IRC §§7431(a)(2), 7431(c); 7213(a)(1); 7213A(a)(1)(B), 7213A(b)(1). 
12  Whistleblower Program: Make Unauthorized Disclosures of Return Information by Whistleblowers Subject to 
the Penalties of IRC §§ 7431, 7213, and 7213A, Substantially Increase the Amount of Such Penalties, and 
Make Whistleblowers Subject to the Safeguarding Requirement of IRC §6103(p), National Taxpayer Advo-
cate, Internal Revenue Service, 2015 Annual Report to Congress, Vol. 1, Legislative Recommendations #14, at 
413 (2016), [hereinafter Legislative Recommendations #14], see: 
http://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/2015ARC/ARC15_Volume1.pdf. 
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tleblowers as part of an investigation under the exceptions afforded by IRC §6103(h)(4) 
through confidentiality agreements and IRC §6103(k)(6) for investigative purposes.13 
Sometimes, the whistleblower can only continue to be helpful to the IRS investigation, 
if he knows an important piece of information, which is part of the taxpayer’s confiden-
tial information. 
 
Under IRC §6103(h)(4), the whistleblower enters into a confidentiality agreement with 
the IRS, allowing the IRS to share taxpayer information with the whistleblower, which 
the whistleblower agrees not to disclose.14 However, these confidentiality protections are 
largely ineffective, because the punishment the IRS imposes on the whistleblower is 
considering his violation as a negative factor when computing his final award.15 Because 
such a negative factor would do nothing to dissuade the whistleblower from disclosing 
the information when the award has already been paid, the National Taxpayer Advocate 
suggests the reported taxpayer should be allowed to receive damages for the whistle-
blower’s subsequent unauthorized disclosures.16 If the IRS officer revealed the infor-
mation under one of the exceptions to the general non-disclosure rule, i.e. under 
§6103(h)(4) or §6103(k)(6), then the whistleblower would not be subject to the sanc-
tions. The Whistleblower Office admits that there is no effective sanction if the whistle-
blower violates the confidentiality agreement.17 
 
However, a whistleblower would be subject to IRC §7213 sanctions if he obtained the 
information illegitimately, (such as if the IRS officer wrongly provided him the infor-
mation), and the whistleblower then willfully prints or publishes the information.18 The 
whistleblower would also be subject to the sanctions if he entered into a tax administra-
tion contract with the IRS under an IRC §6103(n) contract.19 However, this remains an 
unused sanction as the IRS has never entered into a contract under IRC §6103(n).20 
 
The question remains whether the sanctions would significantly deter wrongdoing, 
given that the amounts have never been adjusted for inflation since enactment. Estab-
lished more than forty years ago in 1976, the statutory damages under IRC §7431 cap at 			
13  IRC §6103(k)(6); Treasury Regulations § 301.6103(h)(4)-1. 
14  Treasury Regulations §§ 301.7623-3(c)(3)(iii), 301.7623-3(c)(4). 
15  Treasury Regulations § 301.6103(h)(4)-1. 
16  Protect Taxpayer Privacy in Whistleblower Cases, National Taxpayer Advocate, Internal Revenue Service, 
2010 Annual Report to Congress, Vol. 1, Legislative Recommendations #7, at 396-97 (2011), see: 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/tas/legislativerecomendations_2010arc.pdf. 
17  Internal Revenue Service, IRS Whistleblower Program, Fiscal Year 2015, Annual Report to the Congress, at 
9, see: 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/whistleblower/WB_Annual_Report_FY_15_Final%20Ready%20for%20Commis
sioner%20Feb%208.pdf. 
18  IRC § 7213(a)(3). 
19  IRC § 7213(a)(1), (2); see also Treasury Regulation § 301.6103(n)-2(c). 
20  Internal Revenue Service, IRS Whistleblower Program, Fiscal Year 2016, Annual Report to the Congress, at 
8, see: https://www.irs.gov/pub/whistleblower/fy16_wo_annual_report_final.pdf. 
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$1,000 and the fines under IRC §7213 cap at $5,000.21 Adjusted for inflation, these 
amounts would be $4,000 and $21,000 in 2015 dollars.22 Instituted in 1997, the $1,000 
maximum fine under §7213 is slightly less outdated, but would also be greater at $1,500 
in 2015 dollars.23 
 
D. Lack of Safeguards 
 
Safeguards are one of the methods of ensuring that information is not disclosed and that 
it is kept physically safe to prevent inadvertent or negligent disclosure. IRC §6103(p)(4) 
has a list of safeguards that the listed government agencies must abide by, such as main-
taining “a secure area or place in which such returns or return information shall be 
stored,” to the satisfaction of the IRS Secretary.24 However, these requirements apply 
only to the IRS officer—not to the whistleblower.25 Therefore, regardless of whether 
the whistleblower acquired the information himself or through the IRS, that infor-
mation would not have a physical information protection when it is in the whistleblow-
er’s hands. One can imagine a situation in which the whistleblower leaves a copy of the 
return information visible or accessible to passing eyes. Thus, the National Tax Payer 
Advocate recommends requiring that the whistleblower enter into confidentiality 
agreements with the IRS that impose a safekeeping requirement.26 However, even if the 
safeguards applied to whistleblowers, the safekeeping requirement would be significant-
ly more difficult to enforce than to the officers, as the IRS Secretary cannot as easily 
oversee a whistleblower as he can an IRS agent. 
 
 An existing rule does impose safeguard requirements on the whistleblower: IRC 			
21  Whistleblower Program: Make Unauthorized Disclosures of Return Information by Whistleblowers Subject to 
the Penalties of IRC §§ 7431, 7213, and 7213A, Substantially Increase the Amount of Such Penalties, and 
Make Whistleblowers Subject to the Safeguarding Requirement of IRC §6103(p), National Taxpayer Advo-
cate, Internal Revenue Service, 2015 Annual Report to Congress, Vol. 1, Legislative Recommendations #14, 
supra note 12, at 416 (2016), see: 
http://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/2015ARC/ARC15_Volume1.pdf.  
22  Id. 
23  Id. 
24  IRC §6103(p)(4). 
25  Whistleblower Program: Make Unauthorized Disclosures of Return Information by Whistleblowers Subject to 
the Penalties of IRC §§ 7431, 7213, and 7213A, Substantially Increase the Amount of Such Penalties, and 
Make Whistleblowers Subject to the Safeguarding Requirement of IRC §6103(p), National Taxpayer Advo-
cate, Internal Revenue Service, 2015 Annual Report to Congress, Vol. 1, Legislative Recommendations #14, 
supra note 12, at 416 (2016), see: 
http://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/2015ARC/ARC15_Volume1.pdf. 
26  Whistleblower Program: The IRS Whistleblower Program Does Not Meet Whistleblowers’ Need for In-
formation During Lengthy Processing Times and Does Not Sufficiently Protect Taxpayers’ Confiden-
tial Information From Re-Disclosure by Whistleblowers, National Taxpayer Advocate, Internal Revenue 
Service, Objectives Report to Congress Fiscal Year 2017, Vol. 2, IRS Responses and National Taxpayer Advo-
cate’s Comments: Regarding Most Serious Problems Identified in the 2015 Annual Report to Congress, at 83 
(2017) (providing IRS’ response to the Tax Advocate Service’s recommendation), see: 
https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/2017-JRC/Volume_2.pdf 
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§6103(n). Still, the situation that would allow for the application of this rule has never 
arisen.27 This provision allows the IRS to enter the premises of the whistleblower (or his 
legal representative) and ensure that the return information is secure.28 However, this 
provision only applies when the IRS enters into what is known as a “tax administration” 
contract with the whistleblower. Because the IRS has never entered into a 6103(n) con-
tract with a whistleblower, this safeguard remains but an empty protection. 
 
E. Lack of Remedies 
 
The remedy that is available under current code provisions is significantly outdated. 
Even seeking the remedy may prove difficult, as the taxpayer would not be a party to the 
case to be able to have a claim for damages.29 To make matters worse, if the Tax Court 
found that the reported taxpayer was noncompliant as the whistleblower insists he is, it 
is likely the nonparty taxpayer will have even more difficulty in winning damages be-
cause there would be a prejudice against him. Even if the Tax Court determines that the 
taxpayer was indeed compliant, the nonparty taxpayer has had his information disclosed 
publicly for no reason. The reported taxpayer would still face the burden of showing 
damages for ruining a name, which is difficult to quantify. This scenario assumes that 
the taxpayer was aware that he was mentioned in the claim. However, because there is 
no notice requirement, the taxpayer may have never known that the whistleblower 
mentioned his information, which is itself a disturbing matter.30 
 
 
 
F. Lack of Judicial Procedural Rules 
 
In 2012, the Tax Court amended its procedural rules to require that the whistleblower 
who appeals an IRS award decision must exclude or redact the reported taxpayer’s iden-
tifying information. Previously, whistleblower pleadings and court decisions regularly 
included the reported taxpayer information as a matter of practice.31 An area when tax-
payer information may become inappropriately disclosed is in discovery. As the IRS 
admitted, “[t]here appears to be no effective sanction, and no effective restraint, when a 
whistleblower obtains confidential taxpayer information in discovery and chooses to 			
27  Fiscal Year 2016, Annual Report to Congress, supra note 20. 
28  IRC § 6103(n). 
29  Internal Revenue Service, Whistleblower Program (Internal Revenue Code 7623), Fiscal Year 2014, Report to 
the Congress, at 7, see: 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/whistleblower/WB_Annual_Report_FY_14_Final_Signature_June_11-
signed%20corrected.pdf. 
30  Most Serious Problems #13, supra note 6, at 156. 
31  See, e.g., Cooper v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 135 T.C. 70, 71 (T.C. 2010) (in which a whistleblower 
appealed to the Tax Court when his claim had not resulted in a reward and unfairly disclosed the reported 
taxpayer’s name. The Court determined the taxpayer owed nothing in taxes.). 
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release that information to the public.”32 In the 2016 Annual Report, the IRS stated 
“there is no restraint on whistleblowers redisclosing return information following the 
completion of the administrative and judicial processes.”33 Such a lack of protective judi-
cial measures is particularly unsettling given the simultaneous lack of statutory protec-
tions discussed above. 
 
While the United States IRS Whistleblower Program has taken laudable strides to im-
prove the protection of taxpayer information, there remains a need for reinforced pro-
tections, as other governments should take note. 
III. EUROPE 
 
  As the European Parliament announced it would “study best practices from whistle-
blower programmes already in place in other countries around the world,”34 it is likely 
that the EP will look to the United States IRS Whistleblower Program. However, it is 
unlikely that they prioritize the taxpayer right to privacy given their broad and media-
driven agenda. With the media pressures that have accompanied the recent LuxLeaks 
scandal—whereby Luxembourg strives to convict high-profile whistleblowers to uphold 
its legislative protection of business secrets, much to the dismay of the European Parlia-
ment— it is likely that the public and the parliament will align with the interests of the 
whistleblower, forgetting those of the taxpayer civilians. 
 
The European Parliament voted to institute a whistleblower protection program in the 
February 14, 2017 plenary session.35 The European Parliament requested that the Com-
mission submit a legislative proposal before the end of 2017, and called upon those 
Member States that do not have existing principles in their domestic law that protect 
whistle-blowers to introduce these as soon as possible.36 Indeed, after the LuxLeaks 
verdict, which German MEP, Sven Giegold calls one that reduces “heroes to criminals,” 
Members of the European Parliament demand a new and comprehensive whistleblower 
program.37 38 
 			
32  Report to the Congress, supra note 29. 
33  Annual Report to the Congress, supra note 4. 
34  European Parliament Resolution on the role of whistleblowers in the protection of EU’s financial interests 
(Feb. 2 2017), 2016/2055(INI), P8_TA -PROV(2017)0022, see: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+TA+P8-TA-2017-
0022+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN. 
35  Teri Sprackland, European Parliament Votes for EU-Wide Whistleblower Protection, taxnotes, Worldwide 
Tax Daily (Feb. 15, 2017), see: http://www.taxnotes.com/worldwide-tax-daily/2017-02-15. 
36  Id. 
37  Teri Sprackland, Appeals Court Reduces Sentence of LuxLeaks Whistleblower, taxnotes, Worldwide Tax 
Daily (Mar. 16, 2017), see: http://www.taxnotes.com/worldwide-tax-daily/2017-03-16. 
38  EU Parliamentary Group Criticizes LuxLeaks Appeal Verdict, Tax Analysts, Transfer Pricing Expert, (Mar. 
16, 2017), see: http://www.taxnotes.com/transfer-pricing-expert. 
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The program goals seem overambitious in scope. It seeks to protect whistleblowers that 
“disclose their information on possible irregularities affecting the financial interests of 
the Union.”39 The definition of “possible irregularities” has yet to be limited. A U.K. 
MEP, Molly Scott Cato advocated for protection in “all areas of EU competence,” men-
tioning “environmental crimes, human rights violations, and any other wrongdoing.”40 
If the final proposals do indeed reflect such a broad vision, the implementation may 
prove unwieldy, given the complexity inherent in each area. The United States boasts its 
own independent office for purely tax whistleblowing and despite this dedicated re-
source; the complexity of the problem proves there are no easy answers. 
 
With the European Parliament’s broad ambitions, it is likely that the privacy rights of 
the taxpayer will be neglected. The text adopted by the European Parliament focuses 
exclusively on the confidentiality of the whistleblower and does not mention protecting 
the interests of the reported taxpayer. Thankfully, the European Parliament does men-
tion inclusion of a good faith requirement (albeit a relatively lenient one), which would 
aim to bar ill-intentioned whistleblowers, by requiring a reasonable belief that the in-
formation is true at the time the whistleblower reports it, with an allowance for honest 
errors.41 Barring bad faith whistleblowers is a preventative measure in minimizing whis-
tleblowers from intentionally disclosing taxpayer information. 
 
The European Commission is expected to provide an anti-tax-evasion directive, which 
would include some whistleblower protections in 2017.42 However, unless there are 
specific safeguards to protect taxpayer privacy, such a directive could serve to erode tax-
payer privacy rights instead of protect them. 
 
With the difficulty of implementing a whistleblower program and the circumstances 
that glorify the protection of the whistleblowers, European taxpayers have reason to be 
fear for their privacy rights. 
IV. AUSTRALIA 
 
  The Australian Government of the Treasury issued a consultation paper, called Review 
of Tax and Corporate Whistleblower Protections in Australia, which is not law, but is a 
discussion paper that solicited comments from the public by February 10, 2017. The 
consultation paper is much more detailed than Europe’s published plans, and does ex-
plicitly contemplate the importance of protecting the taxpayer. It specifically refers to 			
39  EU Parliament Issues Motion for Resolution on Whistleblower Protection, Tax Analysts, Worldwide Tax 
Daily, Other Administrative Documents (Feb. 15, 2017), see: http://www.taxnotes.com/worldwide-tax-
daily/2017-02-15. 
40  Teri Sprackland, European Parliament Votes for EU-Wide Whistleblower Protection, Worldwide Tax Daily 
(Feb. 15, 2017), see: http://www.taxnotes.com/worldwide-tax-daily/2017-02-15. 
41  Id. 
42  Id. 
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the regimes in place in the US, New Zealand, and Canada, and announces that like the 
laws in these jurisdictions, the Australian Tax Office will be prohibited from releasing 
“any information pertaining to the progress of the investigation.”43 While these state-
ments may not become law, the fact that the consultation paper at least contemplates 
the privacy of the taxpayer should be reassuring to Australian taxpayers. As part of the 
comments it sought from the public, it explicitly asked commenters whether they agree 
“that the proposed tax whistleblower protections should include provisions preventing 
the disclosure of taxpayer information to the informant.”44 A commenter, Kenneth H. 
Ryesky, Esq. wisely observed that “[i]n processing the whistleblower report, there needs 
to be an evenhanded balance between the whistleblower and the taxpayer who is the 
subject of the whistleblowing.”45 The Australian government shows admirable clairvoy-
ance in contemplating the risks to taxpayer privacy rights even at such an early stage in 
the implementation of its whistleblower program. 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
The global push towards increased compliance is a worthy one, but as the United States 
IRS Whistleblower Program shows, without the proper safeguards, compliance endan-
gers taxpayer privacy. Perhaps this is a compromise taxpayers are willing to make. But 
such a compromise should be the result of a conscious choice as opposed to an ignored 
side effect. The IRS Whistleblower Program has made great progress since it was first 
instituted, and the Tax Court has amended its procedural rules to provide more protec-
tion for taxpayer privacy thanks to advocates of taxpayer privacy. With this knowledge, 
the United States and other jurisdictions may optimistically journey towards a future of 
increased compliance while valiantly striving to protect taxpayer privacy. 
			
43  The Australian Government, Review of Tax and Corporate Whistleblower Protections in Australia, 
THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT THE TREASURY, (Dec. 20, 2016), see: 
http://www.treasury.gov.au/~/media/Treasury/Consultations%20and%20Reviews/Consultations/2016/W
histleblower%20protections/Key%20Documents/PDF/CP-whistleblowing.ashx 
44  Id. 
45  Commentary Submission by Kenneth H. Ryesky, Esq., Practitioner Responds to Australian Whistleblower 
Protections Consultation, WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY (Feb. 7, 2017). See: 
http://www.taxnotes.com/worldwide-tax-daily/2017-02-07. 
 
